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Abstract
Most words in natural languages are polysemous, that is they have related but different
meanings in different contexts. These polysemous meanings (senses) are marked by their struc-
turedness, flexibility, productivity, and regularity. Previous theories have focused on some of
these features but not all of them together. Thus, I propose a new theory of polysemy, which
has two components. First, word meaning is actively modulated by broad contexts in a con-
tinuous fashion. Second, clustering arises from contextual modulations of a word and is then
entrenched in our long term memory to facilitate future production and processing. Hence,
polysemous senses are entrenched clusters in contextual modulation of word meaning and a
word is polysemous if and only if it has entrenched clustering in its contextual modulation. I
argue that this theory explains all the features of polysemous senses.
In order to demonstrate more thoroughly how clusters emerge from meaning modulation
during processing and provide evidence for this new theory, I implement the theory by train-
ing a recurrent neural network (RNN) that learns distributional information through exposure
to a large corpus of English. Clusters of contextually modulated meanings emerge from how
the model processes individual words in sentences. This trained model is validated against
a human-annotated corpus of polysemy, focusing on the gradedness and flexibility of poly-
semous sense individuation, a human-annotated corpus of regular polysemy, focusing on the
regularity of polysemy, and behavioral findings of offline sense relatedness ratings and online
sentence processing.
Last, the implication to philosophy of this new theory of polysemy is discussed. I focus
on the debate between semantic minimalism and semantic contextualism. I argue that the
phenomenon of polysemy poses a severe challenge to semantic minimalism. No solution is
foreseeable if the minimalist thesis is kept, and the existence of contextual modulation is denied
within the literal truth condition of an utterance.
Keywords: Philosophy of Language, Semantics, Pragmatics, Context, Lexical Meaning,
Polysemy, Computational Modeling
i
Summary for Lay Audience
Some words have more than one related meanings. For example, “lock” can mean a mecha-
nism to fasten something or a confined section of waterway, and these two meanings are related
to the concept of restriction. This phenomenon is called polysemy. Polysemy has some inter-
esting features. For example, some meanings of polysemous words are more regular, such as
the two meanings of “lock” mentioned above, but some meanings are less prototypical but still
connect with the core regular meaning, such as the technique — “lock” of limbs in wrestling.
Furthermore, new meanings can be created as time goes, such as a digital “lock” in the form of
a computer program.
I propose a theory of polysemy to explain what polysemy is and why it has these features.
I draw my theory from two characteristics of language. First, contexts of language use often
change and contribute new information to the meaning of a word in use. Second, some contex-
tual uses of language are similar and frequent so they are strengthened in our memory to ease
future use. Polysemy, in my theory, is the collection of strengthened contextual meanings, or
more formally, entrenched clusters of contextual meaning modulations.
In this dissertation, I compare my theory with other theories of polysemy, demonstrate how
my theory of polysemy could explain the features of polysemy better. I also implement my
theory in a computational model and verify it with annotated corpus and behavioral findings to
collect evidence for my theory. Last, I discuss the implication of my new theory of polysemy
to philosophy of language.
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Chapter 1
Introduction to Polysemy and Theories of
Polysemy
1.1 Introduction
In some very loose sense, word meanings are context-sensitive, as meanings of a word can
be different in different contexts1. In this dissertation, I focus on a specific kind of context-
sensitivity of meaning — polysemy. Polysemy is the phenomenon that a single word type2 has
multiple related literal meanings, which we traditionally call senses of a word. For example,
“cup” can either mean a container in “I broke my cup” or its contents in “I finished my cup,”
and which sense it means depends on the context. Note that the content sense and container
sense are semantically related.
Before the review of the phenomenon of polysemy, I want to briefly contrast it with other
similar context-sensitivity of word meaning. First, there is the phenomenon that two words
1There is a very radical sense of context-sensitivity that word meanings change diachronically very quickly,
imagining the meaning of “awful” changes from “inspiring wonder (or fear)” to “very bad” in a second. There
is another radical sense that word meaning does not change in context at all as there is a minimal shared core
among all uses of the same word, as long as there is an intersection. I do not mean these radical senses of context
sensitivity. Instead, I mean the context sensitivity in communication where a word can refer to different things in
different contexts of use.
2Word type is a word understood as a type rather than a token. For example, there are three “cup” tokens but
only one “cup” type in “cup, cup, cup.”
1
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have the same pronunciation, such as “loch” in “loch lake” and “lock” in “door lock,” so a
single sound can have different meanings, which is called homophony. Second, there is the
phenomenon that two words share the same pronunciation and spelling such as “lock” as in “a
lock of hair” and “lock” in “a door lock,” so that a single spelling and sound can have different
meanings, which is called homonymy. Third, a single word can have different literal meanings
(senses) in different contexts. For example, the word “lock” can either mean a mechanism for
keeping an item fastened in the context of “a door lock” or a confined section of canal or water
in “a lock filled with water.” This is the topic of this dissertation — polysemy. Lastly, there
are more ad-hoc context-sensitivity of words such as metaphor and metonymy. For example,
the word “lock” means differently from its literal meaning in “his heart is a lock without any
key.”
In this chapter, I discuss different features of polysemy and review the previous theories of
polysemy. I also argue that most theories fail to capture all these features, which motivates my
theory of polysemy that polysemy is clustering and entrenchment of meaning modulation in
context, as discussed in the second chapter.
1.2 Features of Polysemy
In this section, I first focus on different features of polysemy that makes it interesting and
distinctive and then discuss how it differs from other context-sensitivity of word meaning such
as homonymy or metaphor. I propose that these features should be captured by a successful
theory of polysemy.
1.2.1 Relatedness and Structuredness
One key feature of polysemy is that different senses of a polysemous word are semantically
related. “Lock” as the confined compartment of a canal and the lock as a mechanism of fas-
tening share the base root meaning of barrier, enclosure, confinement, which is separated from
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the reading3 of “lock” as a piece of hair coils or hangs together. As a result, linguists usually
categorize “canal lock” and “door lock” as polysemy but “door lock” and “a lock of hair” as
homonymy depending on the relatedness of different senses/readings of a word.
The relatedness between polysemous senses is intricate. Different senses are related in
a structured way. Some polysemous words have a central sense, and other senses of it are
derived from it. For example, “lock” has a central sense of confinement and enclosure. Senses
of different kinds of confinement, such as canal lock, are derived from this central one. New
senses can also derive from already derived senses. For example, “over” has a central sense of
spatial relation of one is higher than another, such as “a tent over the bed.” A spatial trajectory
sense of going above and across is derived from this spatial relation sense, such as “we climbed
over this mountain.” Furthermore, a temporal trajectory/duration sense can be further derived
from the spatial trajectory sense of “over,” such as “we talked over coffee.” As a result, different
senses of a word can form an intricate radial network where peripheral senses are radiated from
the central sense (Brugman, 1988).
1.2.2 Gradedness and Flexibility
On a coarse scale, we can represent polysemous senses as discrete pieces that form a network.
However, on a finer scale, the identities of senses are more graded and difficult to determine.
For example
(1) Trout is a baseball star.
(2) Leonardo DiCaprio is a movie star.
(3) Venus is the evening star.
(4) You cannot see any star in the daytime
(5) Venus is not a star.
3In this dissertation, “reading” refers to different meanings of homonyms while sense refers to different mean-
ings of polysemous words.
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It is easier to distinguish (1) and (2) from (3), (4), and (5), but questions arise when dis-
tinguishing more similar uses with each other. Does “baseball star” in (1) belong to the same
sense as “movie star” in (2)? Is the more general sense of star (a luminous point in the night
sky, excluding the sun) in (3) and (4) the same sense of fixed star (a large and fixed incan-
descent astronomical object) in (5)? Clearly, we can say loosely that Venus is a star, but we
can also say strictly that Venus is not a star because it is a planet. So both (3) and (5) can be
true depending on what is meant by “star.” The borderlines between each different sense of a
polysemous word are not always clear. The difference between senses is more likely to be a
gradient, and these cases exhibit the gradedness of sense individuation. Ambridge (2019) in-
troduces a similar notion called the lumping-or-splitting problem. When individuating senses,
theorists who treat cases like this in the usual way have to either lump different uses into one
sense or split them into different senses. Lumping is difficult because it may ignore the mean-
ing difference within the lumped sense category. Splitting is also difficult because there is no
principled way to stop further splitting.
This lumping or splitting problem marks the gradedness of polysemy: that different senses
of polysemous words are not clear cut and set in stone. Instead, the individuation of senses is
often graded. Some uses are more easy to categorize while some are not. On the flip side, the
gradedness of polysemy makes polysemy flexible. Speakers are not limited to a finite number
of discrete options when they use a polysemous word. Instead, polysemous words can be used
in numerous less typical ways that are akin to the more prototypical senses.
1.2.3 Productivity
Polysemous words are not only flexible, but also extendable to new senses, and we understand
perfectly these newly created senses without explicit instruction. So it is different from slang
terms that mostly need to be taught. We call this property of polysemy productivity. For
example, it is known that the names of authors can mean either the person or his or her work.
(6) Shakespeare was well educated.
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(7) People don’t read much Shakespeare hereabouts.
(8) Every library has some Shakespeares.
“Shakespeare” in (6) refers to the person Shakespeare, while “Shakespeare” and “Shake-
speares” in (7) and (8) refer to the work or copies of work of Shakespeare. These two senses
are very common and entrenched in English, but there are also cases in which “Shakespeare”
acquires new senses relatively recently.
(9) The Shakespeare in my Kindle is locked.
Here, “Shakespeare” in (9) refers to a digital file that can be locked digitally — encryption.
It is clear that this sense of a digital file did not exist in the past and was not explicitly instructed
to English speakers. However, it can be readily understood by competent English speakers.
(10) Tom is a fast runner.
(11) Jack is a fast haircutter.
(12) Jim is a fast recoverer from COVID-19.
Similarly, the polysemy of the adjective “fast” is productive in that it can also be extended
to new senses as fast in terms of making a hair cut in (11) and fast in terms of recovering from
symptoms of COVID-19 in (12).
In sum, the productivity of polysemy is the feature that polysemous words acquire new
senses without explicit instruction.
1.2.4 Regularity and Literalness
The regularity of polysemy means two things. First, polysemy is not an ad-hoc and one-off
meaning variation, such as live metaphors. Polysemous senses are clearly used many times
by many people in many places, so polysemy is different from the ad-hoc meaning variation
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in context in terms of its regularity of uses. Second, regularity of polysemy refers to a par-
ticular category of polysemy – regular polysemy. It is not the case that only “Shakespeare”
and “Jiangtian” can mean either the person or the person’s written word. The pattern of au-
thor sense and work sense applies exists in a lot of other names, such as “Dumas.” Therefore,
not only a particular sense but a pattern of different senses can be regular. The latter is called
regular polysemy. Regular polysemy is a subcategory of polysemous words sharing patterns
with other polysemous words so that their senses follow a similar sense pattern, such as the
AUTHOR-WORK pattern. A formal definition of regular polysemy was first given by Apres-
jan (1974).
“Polysemy of the word A with the meanings ai and a j is called regular if, in the
given language, there exists at least one other word B with the meanings bi and b j,
which are semantically distinguished from each other in exactly the same way as
ai and a j and if ai and bi, a j and b j are nonsynonymous.”
Besides different names meaning both the person and his or her work, regular polysemy is
also exemplified by words like “bottle” and “can.” Both of them have the container and the
content sense as in (13)/(14) and (15)/(16). These two senses have similar uses in “bottle” and
“can.”
(13) This bottle tastes better.
(14) This bottle is fragile.
(15) I ate a whole can.
(16) I threw out an empty can.
There are other categories of regular polysemy, such as INFORMATION-ARTICLE in
“book” and “paper,” and MEAT-ANIMAL in “chicken” and “fish.” Within each category, there
are many words retaining the same sense pattern. These regularities indicate that different
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senses of polysemous words are organized in a structured way, and certain structures can be
shared by other words so that they compose a regular category.
As a result, a theory of polysemy should capture the structure governing the different senses
of a polysemous word and particularly the regular structure as exemplified in “bottle” and
“can.”
1.2.5 Behavioral Characteristics of Polysemy Processing
Polysemy has also been extensively studied in psycholinguistics with behavioral experiments,
and it has been extensively contrasted with homonyms. People have found the polysemy ad-
vantage that polysemous words are activated faster than homonyms in lexical decision tasks
(Klepousniotou, 2002; Rodd et al., 2002; Brown, 2008), because different senses of polyse-
mous words are more related to each other.
In terms of polysemy itself, the most certain finding is the context effect. Polysemous
senses are processed faster in a context that is consistent with the intended sense. Klein and
Murphy (2001, 2002) first studied how the context of a polysemous word influences its process-
ing in real-time. They found that the reaction time of the sensicality judgment of a phrase with
a polysemous word is faster when primed with a consistent sense than a non-consistent sense.
For example, “wrapping paper” is judged faster when primed by “liberal paper” than “shred-
ded paper.” This effect has also be discovered in more realistic settings (Foraker and Murphy,
2012) where participants read sentences containing both senses of a polysemous word, and
they read the target sense faster in the consistent context. For example, “fabric” is read faster
in the sentence-consistent context (17) than “crop” in the sentence with inconsistent context
(18).
(17) the fashion designers discussed the cotton after the fabric ripped a second time.
(18) The fashion designers discussed the cotton after the crop failed a second time.
The next characteristic is the frequency/dominance effect of polysemous senses. Different
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senses of a polysemous word are used unequally. For example, the thin plastic sense of “film”
is used less frequently/dominantly than the movie sense of “film” in contemporary English.
Polysemous senses that are more frequent are processed faster than less frequent senses when
other conditions are controlled (Foraker and Murphy, 2012). The characteristic can be seen as
the behavioral aspect of the regularity of polysemy discussed in the previous chapters. Polyse-
mous senses are not created purely ad-hoc, but are regularly used so that the frequency of how
regular a polysemous sense modulates how it is processed.
The third characteristic of polysemy is the semantic similarity effect. The semantic simi-
larity between different senses will modulate the processing of this word in the context of an
inconsistent sense. Klepousniotou et al. (2008) and Brown (2008) found that participants are
faster to make sensicality judgment when the sense of the target is more semantically over-
lapped with the sense of prime. For example, it is faster to judge “best-selling book” primed
with “heavy book” than to judge “movie admission” primed with “guilty admission.” This be-
havioral effect echoes the feature of the relatedness of senses. It shows that polysemous senses
are not simply encoded flatly in the lexicon, but there is a structure of how these different senses
are related to each other.
1.3 Polysemy Compared to Other Context-Sensitivities of Word
Meaning
Polysemy is not the only kind of phenomenon in the category of contextual variation of word
meaning. There are other phenomena belonging to this category. In this section, I discuss
homonymy, indexicality, ad-hoc context-sensitivity such as metaphor and metonymy and con-
trast them with polysemy.4
4Pure homophony is not included here because the spelling difference between two tokens, “too” and “to,” can
easily differentiate it from polysemy, where spellings of different tokens are the same.
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1.3.1 Homonymy
First, polysemy is differentiated from homonymy, which is two words of the same spelling and
sound but having very unrelated readings. The relatedness of reading is very important for
distinguishing homonymy from polysemy. Without the help of it, we will not be able to decide
whether two word tokens are of the same word type or two different word types with the same
spelling.
(19) Bats are dangerous animal.
(20) Professional baseball players swing their bats everyday.
The animal reading of “bats” in (19) and the baseball stick sense of “bats” in (20) are
semantically very distinct. Usually, these kinds of homonyms arise from historical accidents
that two distinct words share the same word form.
However, the distinction between homonymy and polysemy is not very clear cut, because
we do not always have a clear cut way to distinguish them. For example, etymology does not
always serve as a perfect test for homonymy. For example, the two readings of the homonym
“bank” as financial institution and riverside actually share the same Germanic origin, which
means the long shaped bench or table (Renaissance Florentine bankers make transactions on
them).
Besides the etymology, people have designed other tests to distinguish polysemy and homonymy.
For example, there is the co-predication test where a homonym, such as “bat,” predicated with
properties of its two different readings, “nocturnal” and “made of wood,” makes the sentence
(21) a bizarre zeugma. Instead, a polysemous word predicated with its two different senses
does not make the sentence semantically anomalous, as in (22).
(21) Bats are nocturnal and usually made of wood.
(22) Novels are enjoyable and usually very long.
(23) Huge amount of power is desired by any supercomputer and president.
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Similarly, the co-predication test is not perfect. Typical polysemous words, such as “power”
in (23), fail the test. There are other problems of testing polysemy and homonymy, which are
well covered in Sennet (2016)’s summary.
As a result, the distinction between homonymy and polysemy is not clear cut. The related-
ness of senses makes the difference between homonymy and polysemy to be better understood
as a gradient. However, it does not mean that homonymy and polysemy are the same. It means
that homonymy and polysemy differ in a continuous spectrum of semantic relatedness. The
difference in relatedness of senses does make homonyms behave differently from polysemy,
as summarized in the previous sections. For example, homonyms cannot be used flexibly and
productively. On the contrary, there are no intermediary senses between the animal bat and
baseball bat so that the “borderline” between them is easier to draw than that of homonyms.
1.3.2 Indexicality
Indexical terms include pronouns and demonstrative terms such as “I,” “he,” “now,” or “this.”
In one sense, the meaning of these terms is constant across different contexts. “I” always means
the speaker of the current utterance. “He” always means the previously mentioned or an easily
identified man or boy. “Now” always means the time at present. However, in another sense,
the meanings of these terms are very context-sensitive because the extensions of these terms,
which are things referred to by these terms, vary in different contexts. Just a simple example,
(24) Tom says, “I am in love with you.”
(25) Jack says, “I want to stay away from the danger.”
The “I” in both (24) and (25) means the speaker of the utterance, but they refer to different
persons. The extension of “I” in (24) is Tom, while it is Jack for “I” in (25). Kaplan (Almog
et al., 1989) introduced the notion of character to capture this kind of context-sensitivity. The
character of a word is a function from the context of the word to its extension, and this function
can be captured by a uniform rule or criterion such as “the most obvious man in the context.”
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The character for indexical terms itself does not change in different contexts, but the output
(extension) changes because the input into the character of indexical terms changes. This
explains the intuition that “I” has a constant meaning (character) but means different persons
in different contexts (extension).
Indexicality is different from polysemy because there is no uniform rule or criterion, such
as the current speaker of the utterance of “I,” that determines the extension of polysemous
words in context. The extensions of “lock” in “door lock” and “canal lock” are determined dif-
ferently with different criteria so that the context-sensitivity of polysemous words results from
the variation of characters rather than only their extensions. As a result, indexicality is the phe-
nomenon of extension variation without character variation, but polysemy is the phenomenon
of character variation along with extension variation in context.
1.3.3 Ad-hoc Meaning Variation
Last, we have ad-hoc meaning variation, such as live metaphors.
(26) A work is a death mask of its conception.
In the literature of metaphor, “death mask” in (26) is called a source, and “work” is called
a target. It is not very often one sees work described as a death mask, and “death mask” is also
rarely used to mean an end. If it is the first time someone encounters (26), it may take a second
to interpret what is meant by this sentence.
Metonymy is another kind of ad-hoc meaning variation wherein the extension of a word is
mapped to another entity in very different categories. In (27), the extension of “ham sandwich”
is mapped from the sandwich to the person who ordered a sandwich.
(27) The ham sandwich is getting impatient
In these cases, the frequency of use (regularity) marks the dimension that polysemy is dif-
ferent from ad-hoc meaning variation. Ad-hoc meaning variations are one-off cases involving
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more creativity, which constitutes wholly novel use of an existing word. In contrast, polysemy
is mostly conventionalized and hence used more frequent than live metaphors and metonymy.
In sum, homonymy, indexicality, and ad-hoc meaning variation are all different from pol-
ysemy. Homonymy is different from polysemy in terms of the relatedness of different senses
of a word in different contexts. Indexicality results from uniform rule-like determination of
referents of a word in context, which is absent in polysemy. Finally, ad-hoc meaning variation
is less frequent and more novel than polysemy. Even though the differences between polysemy
and other context-sensitivities may not always be clear-cut, it does not negate that most of the
cases are different, and these differences should be captured by theories of polysemy.
1.4 Previous Theories of Polysemy
During the last 30 years, there have been some systematic studies on polysemy in theoret-
ical linguistics, psycholinguistics, and philosophy of language. Falkum and Vicente (2015)
provide a systematic review of these studies. Instead of reviewing different theories of poly-
semy based on different fields of studies, I focus on the general theoretical assumptions behind
them. Therefore, I categorize these theories of polysemy into two groups, the static account
and the operational account, based on whether they encode the polysemous senses statically
into the semantic representation5 posited in their theories. I also discuss how well each account
explains the features proposed in the previous sections.
1.4.1 Static Account of Polysemy
The static account captures polysemy in terms of the type meaning of a polysemous word — the
context-free semantic representation of a polysemous word statically encoded in the lexicon.
In this representation, there are structures explicitly encoding different senses of a polysemous
5The term representation used in this dissertation is twofold. First, it refers to the mental representation as
our knowledge of language. Second, it also refers to the representation in a linguistic theory. These two intended
meanings are different if one does not equate a theory of linguistics with a theory of our mental knowledge of
language.
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word. The structure can be a list of possible senses, a network where senses correspond to
different nodes in the network, or a set of different activation patterns of neuron-like units. The
common theme among these accounts is that senses of a polysemous word are directly and
statically encoded in the type meaning of the word. I will now consider several sub-varieties.
Sense-enumerative Account
The sense-enumerative account of polysemy is the most straightforward theory of polysemy.
Different senses of a word are just encoded as a list of discrete entries in the lexicon. Con-
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Here, the semantic representation of “cup” is a list with two discrete entries of senses,
CUP-CONTAINER as in “I broke a cup” and CUP-CONTENT as in “I finished my cup.”
Other senses can be added in a similar fashion. The processing of “cup” in context is a process
of disambiguation to one among the listed entries. In other words, polysemy is literally the
one-to-many mapping between form and meaning, and there is no sophisticated relationship
between different senses.
There are a couple of problems with this approach. First, listing senses like dictionary
entries could not capture the flexibility of polysemy. There is no way to capture polysemy that
does not align strictly with the encoded senses. Second, listing senses does not capture the
structuredness of polysemy. A flat list does not represent the relationship between different
senses of a word. Third, probably the worst problem is that a list of senses is of necessity
very small so that it does not capture the productivity of polysemy. A list does not tell us the
unbounded possibility of creative new uses.
Chapter 1. Introduction to Polysemy and Theories of Polysemy 14
Semantic Network Account
Another way to encode different senses of polysemous words is to represent them as a semantic
network in which different senses are nodes and connected by edges of different relationships.
The iconic work is Brugman (1988)’s analysis of the polysemous word “over.”
(29) The painting is over the mantel.
(30) The plane is flying over the hill.
(31) Sam is walking over the hill.
(32) Sam lives over the hill.
(33) The wall fell over.
(34) Sam turned the page over.
(35) Sam turned over.
(36) She spread the tablecloth over the table.
(37) Guards were posted all over the hill.
(38) The play is over.
(39) Do it over, but don’t over do it.
In Brugman (1988)’s work, different senses of “over” compose a network structure in which
there is a prototypical sense “above cross sense” as in (30) and other senses are derived from
this sense. The benefit of this network representation over the sense-enumerative account is
that it captures the relationship among senses and how each sense derives from other senses.
The network model is clearly an improvement from the sense-enumerative account as it
captures the sophisticated structure of senses. Different polysemous words could have different
structures of sense organization encoded as the network topology. The regular pattern of the
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polysemous word “bottle” can be captured by the topology of the network so that “bottle”
shares with words such as “glass” similar network topologies. However, this account still does
not deal with the flexibility of polysemous words. Senses have to be individuated as nodes in
the network, so it faces the same final problem as the sense-enumerative account.
Distributed Representation Accounts
The third option is widely used in the literature of connectionist modeling. In connectionist
modeling of polysemy (Rodd et al., 2004; Armstrong and Plaut, 2008, 2016; Rodd, 2020),
each different sense of a polysemous word is encoded as the activation pattern of multiple
neuron-like units. Thus, a sense is not represented as an entry in a list or a node in a network
but distributed among multiple units. Each unit can represent a semantic feature so that a dis-
tributed representation can be understood to be a weighted list of semantic features. However,
this is not mandatory, as most models utilizing distributed representation do not assume that a
unit has to represent only one feature. Some models also use continuous activation values for
units so that the semantic feature is not binary.
Item type Orthography Context Semantics
Unambiguous 0100 10 000000000000000001111
0100 01 000000000000000001111
Polysemous 0010 10 000000001111000000000
0010 01 000000000111100000000
Homonymous 0001 10 000000001111000000000
0001 01 111100000000000000000
Table 1.1: Unambiguity, polysemy, and homonymy representations in attractor networks. Rep-
resentations are coded using binary units of 1 or 0. Polysemy is coded as an identical ortho-
graphic code (0010) mapping onto two different but overlapping semantic codes, differentiated
via a set of context features that condition the recognition of one or another. Unambiguous
words have the very same activation patterns while homonyms have totally different activation
patterns. Adapted from Armstrong and Plaut (2016).
Rodd et al. (2004)’s and Armstrong and Plaut (2008, 2016)’s models are attractor net-
works. Attractors networks are highly interconnected networks, whose activity settles into a
stable state after a period of time. Basically, their models have a layer of orthography repre-
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senting the word form of polysemous words and another layer of semantics representing the
senses of polysemy. These two layers are connected so that a word form can activate its word
meaning. They train their models until the semantic layer learns to settle into the correct senses
in different contexts. So different senses are represented as different activation patterns in the
same layer of semantics.
One advantage of this account is that it captures the graded difference between homonyms
and polysemy. The relatedness between different senses can be very intuitively captured as
whether there is overlapping in the activation of units. It can also be quantified by formal
distance metrics such as euclidean distance between the activation patterns. Similar to the
semantic network account, this account could potentially capture sophisticated structures of
different senses with the help of probing tasks such as hierarchical clustering. However, senses
are still individuated as discrete rather than continuous patterns of activation. There are no
intermediary senses between the two polysemous senses listed in table 1.1. The same worry of
individuating similar but different senses still looms.
In sum, three different static accounts all have the problem of capturing the flexibility of
polysemy, because they encode the senses directly into the semantics in the lexicon, so they all
face the lumping-or-splitting problem as previously mentioned. No matter how sophisticated
a theorist individuates the senses, there are always cases that do not fit into the represented
sense repository. Furthermore, static accounts cannot capture the productivity of polysemy
because all possible senses are already encoded in the semantic representation. There is a list
of senses to choose from, instead of the on-the-fly generation of senses in a novel context. The
specific one in the context has to be one of them. Without extra mechanisms of encoding new
senses or some kinds of post hoc rule, static accounts lack the explanation of the productivity
of polysemy.
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1.4.2 Operational Accounts of Polysemy
The second type of account, the operational account, does not encode the polysemous sense
directly in the type meaning of the word. Instead, each specific sense is produced through
some kinds of operation in context. This makes the operational account of polysemy both a
consititutive account that tell what polysemy is and a causal account of polysemy explains how
polysemy arises and is processed because the caual account is part of what constitutes poly-
semy6. A word is polysemous if and only if its processing involves certain operations. These
operations include formal semantic coercion and type-shifting, relevance-based pragmatic in-
ference, and so on, so an operational account usually allows more flexible and productive
senses than a static account.
Formal Semantic Account
This account draws upon the solution of the traditional problem of type-shifting, where the
semantic types of two composing words do not match so that some operations to fix the se-
mantic type are introduced. Pustejovsky (1998) first extended this approach to polysemous
word meaning. For each word, its semantic representation is not just a list of sense entries but
an organized repository of feature structures, which includes lexical typing structure, argument
structure, event structure, and qualia structure. Below is the basic template of the semantic
representation of a word “x.”7
6This echoes the causal account of names (Kripke, 1980) which answers in virtue of what does a name has its
meaning. The answer is the causal chain that determines how the initial meaning is baptized and later transmitted.
7Adapted from (Pustejovsky, 1998, p.101)












CONST = what x is made of
FORMAL = what x is
TELIC = function of x
AGENT = how x came into being
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Not only can different senses be stored in the semantic structure, but new senses can also be
generated productively in context from the qualia structure because it contains rich information
about the function and constitution of the object referred to by the word.
For example,
(41) Tom threw the book.
(42) Tom read the book.
(43) Tom began the book.
(42) and (41) can be disambiguated directly from the information in qualia structure in (44)
because “book” is a information.physical object, which has both these aspects. However, the
sense of “book” in (43) as reading the book or writing the book is not directly stored. Instead, it
goes through an operation called type coercion so that an appropriate meaning based on qualia
structure can be generated productively. The verb “began” takes an argument of an event type,
so the meaning of “book” in (43) has to be coerced to the event type and here it can either
be the event of reading books or writing books based on the qualia structure (the TELIC and
AGENT value in this case).
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FORMAL = hold(y, x)
TELIC = read(e,w, x.y)
AGENT = write(e′, v, x.y)
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Generative Lexicon theory is named “generative” because Pustejovsky (1998) considers
the productivity of polysemy to be the central target for his theory to explain. It employs
several operations to explain how new cases of polysemy can be interpreted correctly. However,
generative lexicon theory still has the problem of explaining the flexibility of polysemy because
of the limited operation options and encoded information in the qualia structure.
Relevance Theory
Instead of viewing linguistic communication purely as rule and code-based interaction, rele-
vance theorists (Sperber and Wilson, 1996; Carston, 2008) highlight the pragmatic inference
involved.
Inference utilizes various sources of information. Pragmatic inference is usually achieved
with encyclopedia knowledge that is out of the realm of proper linguistic knowledge. For ex-
ample, when someone interprets the metaphor “Juliet is the sun,” he or she has to understand
the encyclopedia knowledge of the sun as the center of the solar system, it being warm, perpet-
ual, and so on. Relevance theorists also suggest that the inference involved in human language
production and processing is relevance based. Speakers and listeners tend to be geared to the
maximization of relevance, which is defined as how great positive cognitive effects are achieved
and how little processing effort is expended.
For relevance theorists (Falkum, 2011, 2015), polysemy is also explained by relevance-
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based pragmatic inference. During the production and processing of polysemous words, a
context-free concept is first accessed, and then relevance based inference steps in to fulfill the
interpretation as the construction of an ad-hoc concept.
(45) Kate began a book.
(46) KATE BEGAN [VP[V0 e][NP a book]] 8
The first stage of processing of (45) produces the logical form of the sentence in which
“book” is a context-free concept. The verb “began” requires an argument of VP denoting an
event so [V0 e] is interpreted through relevance-based inference to be “write” or “read.” Hence,
the polysemous sense of “book” as “writing a book” or “reading a book” in (45) is achieved on
the fly through the operation of pragmatic inference.
Because of utilizing various sources of information, relevance theories can capture the flex-
ibility of polysemy very well because each different use of the same encoded standing meaning
will initiate different inferences with slightly different sources of information. However, rel-
evance theories lack a full explanation of the regularity of polysemy because any appropriate
ad-hoc concept for a word can be inferred in the context which does not explain where the
regularity is from. Put otherwise, treating polysemy just as ad-hoc concepts may eliminate the
difference between polysemy and metaphor.
Recanati
Recanati (2017a, 2019) notices that polysemy has both the sides of pragmatic modulation and
homonymy. On the one hand, polysemous senses seem to be derived from meaning modulation
in context. On the other hand, they seem to be stored in our memory the way homonyms
are. As a result, Recanati takes polysemy to be conventionalized modulation. There is a
single conventionalized type meaning of polysemous word that constitutes an abstract schema
or a network (Langacker, 1987) and this abstract schema/network guides how polysemous
8Example from (Falkum, 2015, p.89)
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senses are derived in context, which Recanati names conversion into sense (Recanati, 2019).
For Recanati, conversion into sense inherits most of the properties of meaning modulation in
context, but it is mandatory in interpretation. Every polysemous word has to be converted
into a specific sense in every context, while meaning modulation is usually understood to be
optional, occurring only when there is such a need for changing the meaning. Recanati’s
theory of polysemy comes closest in spirit to the theory proposed in the next chapter, where
polysemous senses are understood to be clusters of meaning modulations in context. Setting
aside some differences, this new theory can be seen as an improvement of Recanati’s theory
of polysemy and it offers a more detailed explanation of how conventionalization of meaning
modulation is realized as entrenched clustering.
1.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I reviewed the features of polysemy — relatedness, structuredness, gradedness,
flexibility, regularity, and productivity — and how well previous theories capture these features.
I divided previous theories into two groups, static accounts and operational accounts. Static
accounts encode polysemous senses directly and statically into the semantic representation
– the hearer simply selects among the options, however stored, while operational accounts
represent the polysemous senses as the outputs of the creative and productive operation on the
encoded primitive meaning of a word.
In general, static accounts have the problem of explaining the flexibility and productivity
of polysemy because only a quite limited number of discrete senses are encoded. On the
other hand, operational accounts cannot explain the regularity of polysemy and may blur the
difference between polysemy and pure ad-hoc meaning variation, such as live metaphor or
metonymy.
Chapter 2
A New Theory of Polysemy
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I introduce my theory of polysemy, which covers the learning, representation,
and processing of polysemy. My theory is situated within the operational accounts introduced
in the last chapter so it inherits the general feature of operational accounts that it serves both as
a constitutive account to explain what polysemy is and as a causal account of how polysemy
arises from linguistic use. The causal story of polysemy is part of what constitutes polysemy.
Therefore, this theory is a new attempt at an operational account to capture simultaneously the
relatedness, structuredness, gradedness, flexibility, productivity, and regularity of polysemy, as
summarized in the last chapter.
In this theory, polysemous senses are understood to be clusters and entrenchment in the
modulation of word meaning in context. The “context” here should be understood as the full-
featured context rather than the Kaplanian context as a set of parameters (Almog et al., 1989)
introduced to capture the context-sensitivity of indexical terms. This context includes both the
linguistic context, such as the surrounding linguistic items, and the non-linguistic context, such
as the broad situation where the utterance is produced.
There are two basic components in this theory. First, meaning modulation happens all the
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time in the processing and production of language. Word meaning is modulated by the sur-
rounding words and phrases (linguistic context), and where the utterance is going on, how the
speaker perceives the world, and so on (non-linguistic context). Thus, there are various kinds
of meaning modulations contributing to the variation of word meaning in context, including
but not limited to linguistic coercion, metonymy, and metaphor. Second, modulated meanings
in context cluster and are entrenched if they occur frequently. The entrenched clusters leave
traces on our long-term memory so that some modulations are more readily accessed in future
linguistic processing and production, which we perceive as the literal polysemous senses.
These two components combined together serve as a causal account of how polysemy
emerges in linguistic communication and how polysemy is processed. What is more impor-
tant is that the causal account of how polysemy arises also constitutes what polysemy is. A
word is polysemous if and only if entrenched clustering arises in its meaning modulation dur-
ing its use, as I argue that only a causal account with the two components explain the features
of polysemy introduced in Chapter 1. As a result, this new theory of polysemy serves both a
constitutive and causal account of polysemy.
In the following, I first discuss the two components, meaning modulation and clustering,
in detail. Then, I discuss how they are integrated to explain the learning, representation, and
processing of polysemy. Last, I present how features of polysemy are explained in my theory.
2.2 Two Basic Components: Meaning Modulation and Clus-
tering
The two components of this new theory, meaning modulation and clustering, are motivated
by the need to capture both all the features of polysemy and how polysemy differs from other
context-sensitivity of meaning simultaneously. Previous theories, as discussed in the last chap-
ter, have explained some of them instead of all of them simultaneously.
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2.2.1 Meaning Modulation by Context
Meaning modulation in context is first introduced by Cruse (1986) as a particular kind of
semantic variation in context. This is where the meaning of a word token being “modified in
an unlimited number of ways by different contexts, each context emphasizing certain semantic
traits, and obscuring or suppressing others.” “The variation ... caused by modulation is largely
continuous and fluid in nature.” This is contrasted with the context-sensitivity of indexical
terms, such as “I” and “now,” where the context is modeled as a set of predefined parameters,
because the token meaning (referent) of indexical terms varies with respect to the discrete rules
specified as the character of the term. Cruse also contrasts meaning modulation with contextual
selection, which is another kind of meaning variation in context, for example, in homonyms,
that “proceeds in discrete jumps rather than continuously.”
Although Cruse has different views on what polysemy is, I follow his analysis that meaning
modulation is continuous and fluid and argue that this is the mechanism underlying polysemy.
The continuity of modulation makes it possible that there is much finer meaning in context
than the common taxonomy of polysemous sense allows. Furthermore, I suggest that there are
different kinds of meaning modulation in context, and they all contribute to the phenomena of
polysemy and sometimes even simultaneously.
The following sections cover four common cases of meaning modulation in context. How-
ever, it is not intended to be an exhaustive list of mutual-exclusive options but only as a demon-
stration of the breadth of meaning modulation and its nature of continuity.
Prototypical Meaning Modulation in Context
One prototypical meaning modulation in context is the enrichment of meaning (Recanati,
2004). It is where the meaning of a target word token is made more specific in the broad
non-linguistic context. Thus, it is not linguistically driven (bottom-up from linguistic cues),
but top-down contextually driven.
(1) There is still beer in the fridge.
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First, consider a situation in which a party is going on and someone is asking for beer to
drink. The answer (1) means that there is still bottled or canned beer in the fridge. Second,
when (1) is uttered when someone is cleaning the mess in the fridge, it may mean that there are
still beer stains on the inside surface of the fridge. In both situations, the meanings of the two
tokens “beer” are made more specific to be a particular amount of beer by the non-linguistic
context of utterance, partying, or cleaning. Note that this variation of meaning is not driven
solely by linguistic cues. It is the context of utterance — when, where, and what is happening
in these situations and what these situations usually look like — that initiates the process of
specification, so it counts as top-down enrichment of meaning.
Ad Hoc Linguistic Coercion
In addition to pure top-down modulation, word meaning can also be modulated by the linguistic
contexts, such as the grammatical constructions surrounding the target word. For example, the
argument of a verb can be coerced into a different meaning preferred by the verb.
(2) Jim began the tree.
“Began” in (2) requires an argument that is an event, so “tree” has to be coerced to an
event related to trees. Notice that this coercion also nudges the target meaning towards a more
appropriate direction rather than forcing a discrete jump to familiar meanings. The result of the
coercion can range from a variety of events related to trees such as cutting, planting, drawing,
or even complex events that involve multiple instances of it.
Metonymy
Metonymy is another kind of meaning modulation which converts the token meaning (referent)
of the target word from an entity of one category to another entity in a different category. A
classical example comes from Nunberg (1995).
(3) The ham sandwich is getting impatient
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When (3) is uttered by a waiter, “ham sandwich” refers to the customer who ordered a ham
sandwich because the food ordered by the customer is his or her most salient feature to the
waiter. Metonymy is different from enrichment because the modulated token meaning jumps
to a different domain of entities (food to person) while the token meaning is only made more
specific (beer in general to canned beer) in meaning enrichment. It is thus used as an ad-hoc
and non-literal tool in communication to refer to things in a different category.
Metaphor
Last, we have a more creative ad-hoc meaning variation in context — metaphor. To revisit an
example:
(4) A work is a death mask of its conception.
In the literature of metaphor, “death mask” in (4) is called the source, and “work” is called
the target. The association between the source and the target is so rare that it requires some
creative modulation of the meaning of the source. Here, “death mask” is creatively modulated
to mean an end. If it is the first time for someone to read (4), it may take a second to inter-
pret what is meant by this sentence. In history, there has been a debate on whether metaphor
involves a new propositional meaning besides its literal meaning (Davidson, 1978). However,
most people acknowledge the existence of propositional meaning variation in metaphor. They
believe that the production and interpretation of metaphor modulate the meaning of the source
term with the help of some kinds of interpretive mechanism, such as analogy between two
domains of concepts (Bowdle and Gentner, 2005), categorization of one thing into a differ-
ent category (Glucksberg and Keysar, 1993), or pragmatic inference based on some relevance
principle (Wearing, 2006). For the purpose of introducing my theory, it is only necessary to
note that metaphor forms another category of continuous meaning modulation, and it involves
comparing two even very different domains of conceptual knowledge in order to arrive at the
intended interpretation. Above all, it is probably the most flexible and least restricted category
among all varieties of meaning modulation.
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Summary
Meaning modulation in context is various. As suggested already in the previous chapter, the
examples above clearly do not exhaust all possibilities. However, there are several points about
these cases above that are worth emphasizing here. First, these categories are not mutually
exclusive. For example, (3) can be seen both as a case of metonymy and linguistic coercion,
because the linguistic context, the predicate “impatient,” also coerces the interpretation of “ham
sandwich” to be an animate person besides the non-linguistic context of the restaurant where
the utterance occurs. Second, modulation of meaning can involve very different mechanisms.
Some are more bottom-up linguistically driven, such as linguistic coercion, while some are
more top-down driven, such as enrichment of meaning. Third, modulation of meaning in
context is continuous or at least fine-grained enough to be counted as continuous when we
discuss linguistic meaning. Even the same kind of modulation of the same word type can
produce different token meanings so the token meanings of polysemous words are finer and
more flexible than discrete individuations of polysemy senses. As a result, continuity is needed
to capture the fact that polysemy is graded in nature and allows the flexibility of use, which is
absent in representation with a fixed set of discrete senses.
2.2.2 Clustering of Meaning Modulation
Meaning modulation in context by itself is not equal to polysemy. For instance, polysemy isn’t
as ad hoc as other kinds of meaning modulation. As a result, the second component in this new
theory has to be introduced, which is the clustering of meaning modulation in context.
Semantic Space Model
Before introducing the idea of clustering, it is necessary to first introduce the idea of semantic
space (Churchland, 1993; Lenci, 2008). One way to think about meaning is to conceive it
as a point in a high-dimensional space. Each dimension in this space represents a semantic
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feature such as ANIMATE, CONCRETE, and so on. These feature dimensions construct a
high-dimensional space in which each possible meaning occupies a point in the space. This
way of thinking about meaning provides some powerful tools to characterize the structure and
relationship of linguistic meanings. For example, geometric relationship, such as Euclidean
distance, represents semantic relationship: the closer two points are, the more similar these
two meanings are.
Figure 2.1: Visualization of a Three Dimensional Semantic Space
In Fig. 2.1, each point represents the meaning of a word. The coordinate represents the
value of each semantic feature. For example, the meaning of “fly” has very high motion value
but very low animate and vehicle values. The semantic similarity between “bird” and “dog”
can be represented as the distance between the two points, which is closer than the distance
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between “bird” and “rock.”
Clustering in the Semantic Space Model
Figure 2.2: Visualization of Clustering of Meaning Modulation
When this semantic space model is applied to meaning modulation in context, each point in the
space represents a particular instance of meaning modulation of the same word (token mean-
ing). In Fig. 2.2, every point is an instance of meaning modulation of the same word (token
meaning). Since clustering is defined to be similar things positioned closely together, the clus-
tering of meaning modulation in context can be understood to be the existence of dense clouds
of points in the semantic space. In Fig. 2.2, points are not distributed uniformly. Instead,
they form two clusters of points. Each cluster represents a group of similar modulations in
context, which corresponds to our intuitive notion of a polysemous sense. In addition to the
individuation of senses, clustering provides a way to represent sense structures. It captures the
relatedness between senses by measuring the distance between clusters. It can also capture
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the hierarchical structure of senses and subsenses with the help of hierarchical clustering algo-
rithms. As a result, the polysemous senses and their structures emerge from the clustering of
modulated token meanings in the semantic space.
Notice that polysemous senses understood in this way are not discrete. First, different
senses may overlap with each other just as clusters may overlap, so that there are modulations
of meaning belonging to multiple polysemous senses. The “school” in (5) belongs to both the
institution sense and the building sense. The “school” in (6) belongs to both the professional
school sense and institution sense.
(5) The school has shut itself down.
(6) Tom went to medical school.
Second, there can be different ways to individuate senses based on how fine one wants the
cluster to be.
(7) Mike Trout is a baseball star.
(8) Leonardo DiCaprio is a movie star.
Whether to categorize the “star” in (7) and (8) as the same sense does not have a determinate
answer because it is based on how fine one wants the cluster of meaning modulation to be.9
Third, the distribution of meaning modulation of a word captures whether it is polysemous
or monosemous. The meaning modulation of a polysemous word has a multimodal distribution
as in Fig. 2.2, which is in contrast with a monosemous word in Fig. 2.3. The difference between
a unimodal distribution and multimodal is also graded, which results in the graded difference
between monosemy and polysemy.
9This echoes the practice in applying clustering algorithms that the parameter k (the number of clusters in
k-means algorithm) is usually determined based on our goals of clustering instead of being an objective value.
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Figure 2.3: Visualization of Clustering of a Monosemous Word
Entrenchment from Clustering
The clustering of meaning modulation does not only emerge from uses of polysemous words,
but also has an effect on future cognition in terms of processing and producing polysemous
words, through the mechanism of entrenchment (Langacker, 1987). Entrenchment is the pro-
cess of repetitive exposure and rehearsal of an item or items. It facilitates the future processing
of these items and establishes the entrenched items as a unit (e.g., an idiom). As for polysemy,
the frequency of the meaning modulations in one cluster (token frequency of a sense) will have
an effect on how fast and effortless the sense is processed in the future. Thus, senses with higher
frequency are more entrenched. This is well established in experiments on the frequency effect
of polysemy (Klein and Murphy, 2001, 2002). However, clustering provides more than this
token frequency metric. It captures the number of different clusters — type frequency and the
variability of each different modulation within the cluster — cluster variability.
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Figure 2.4: Visualization of Clustering Properties
These three properties of clustering have critical roles in explaining the productivity of
polysemy, as studies in usage-based linguistics have shown (Tomasello, 2003; Bybee, 2010;
Goldberg, 2019). A small and dense cluster (the purple cluster in Fig. 2.4) means low vari-
ability, which constrains future modulations of this polysemous word to be tightly consistent
with previous modulations. Hence, future modulations of this sense will more likely lie in the
range of this purple cluster. In contrast, a wide and loose cluster (the yellow cluster in Fig.
2.4) means high variability. Thus, future modulations will lie in a wider range in the semantic
space. The type frequency of a cluster depends on the number of points in the cluster, so purple
cluster has higher frequency while yellow cluster has lower frequency. Higher type frequency
will constrain the future productive use more than the lower frequency one. Another way to
think about this is based on dynamic system theory. A tight or frequent cluster forms a strong
attractor in the process of meaning modulation, so that future modulation will gravitate towards
the center of this cluster. Furthermore, a polysemous word with more clusters (higher type fre-
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quency of 4) in Fig. 2.5 is more productive than a polysemous word with fewer clusters, such
as the word represented in Fig. 2.2
Figure 2.5: Visualization of Meaning Modulation with 4 clusters
2.2.3 Example of Polysemy Emerging from Two Components
A full analysis of polysemy in terms of the two components of meaning modulation and clus-
tering cannot be achieved without the computational model introduced in the next chapter.
However, I present some examples of polysemy in this section as a preliminary demonstration
of how these two components work together for some polysemous words.
Clustered enrichment: the word “rabbit” usually refers to the rabbit animal. Sometimes,
enrichment of meaning makes a token of “rabbit” to mean a specific part of a rabbit. For ex-
ample, the “rabbit” in “rabbit coat” is enriched to be the fur of rabbits because of the existence
of the practice of using rabbit fur as a clothing material. This contextual enrichment clusters
and is entrenched so that future tokens of “rabbit coat” are more readily modulated to mean
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the coat made of rabbit fur, so it becomes a new polysemous sense for the word “rabbit.” In
comparison, less entrenched “ coat” phrases allow more flexible interpretation, such as
“panda coat” or “cat coat.”
Clustered coercion: names are paradigmatic cases where linguistic coercion happens.
“Reading Shakespeare is enjoyable” means that reading the works of Shakespeare is enjoy-
able rather than that reading him as a person is enjoyable (even though it is a possible reading
at times). The verb “reading” coerces its argument into the interpretation as readable things.
The names of authors are frequently coerced in this kind of verb bias context so that these kinds
of meaning modulation cluster, are entrenched, and end up to be a literal polysemous sense of
author names.
Clustered metonymy: The White House is the place where the president of the United
States of America lives and works, so it serves as a symbol of the US government. However,
the frequent use of “White House” as a metonym meaning the government of the USA occurs
very frequently and clusters so that this meaning is entrenched as a polysemous sense of “White
House,” and is probably used as frequently as its original sense.
Clustered metaphor: “head” originally means the upper part of an animal. However, it
also refers to the leader of an organization. Conceptual metaphor theory (Lakoff and Johnson,
2008) explains this metaphor as the mapping between two domains of an animal body and an
organization where both the real head and the head person is the part that is in charge of the
whole. This conceptual mapping between these two domains has been entrenched so that the
word “head” acquires the polysemous sense of “person in charge of an organization.”
In sum, polysemy can involve very different varieties of meaning modulations, but what
unites polysemy as a category is the mechanism of clustering and entrenchment. A more
detailed presentation of cases of polysemy requires a quantitative measure of the clustering
effects of meaning modulation. This is discussed in the next chapter.
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2.3 Learning, Representation, and Processing of Polysemy
With the two basic components being introduced, I now discuss how these two components are
integrated into my theory of learning, representation, and processing of polysemy.
In terms of learning, a polysemous word is learned in the same way as a monosemous
word. A different learning procedure is not required because the difference between polysemy
and monosemy is a gradient of the distribution of meaning modulation in context rather than
a categorical difference in the representation of meaning as in static accounts. Polysemous
words can be learned through mechanisms of normal associative learning between words and
concepts (Barak et al., 2019). They can also be learnt through prediction-based learning (El-
man, 1990; Clark, 2013; Rabagliati et al., 2016), which is captured in the next chapter using a
computational model. This learning task — predicting future words based on previous words
— forces the learned semantic representation (type meaning of a word) to encode distributional
information about polysemous words. These kinds of distributional information include word
co-occurrence, which is seen as an important piece of linguistic meaning in most distributional
semantic models (Lenci, 2008). They are based on the principle that, as a general rule, “differ-
ence of meaning correlates with difference of distribution” (Harris, 1954). Other approaches
to word learning also play roles in polysemy learning. The key here is that this theory of pol-
ysemy does not require an additional procedure for learning polysemous words because the
semantic representation for polysemous words is not categorically different from monosemous
words as in the static account.
When it comes to representation, the semantic representation (type meaning) of a polyse-
mous word is the superimposition of all its modulated token meanings in different contexts,
which is the same for a monosemous word. The superimposition of different modulated token
meanings utilizes distributed representations, which encode semantic information in multiple
neuron-like units. Any piece of semantic information is represented by these units together
instead of by a particular unit. As a result, this theory does not represent different senses stat-
ically as discrete entries as in the static account, so it avoids the lumping-or-splitting problem
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of sense individuation, which says that assigning token meanings into discrete sense bins is
impractical and difficult. This distributed superimposition contains but is not limited to the
referential information between words and referred objects as well as the fine-grained word
co-occurrence information. A polysemous word used in different contexts will have differ-
ent referential and word co-occurrence information, and these different pieces of information
are superimposed into a single representation rather than encoded separately. In sum, a poly-
semous word has a single distributed representation as its type meaning, which is abstracted
from all its different modulated token meanings in context and contains both referential and
distributional information.
What makes a word polysemous is how its context-free semantic representation (type mean-
ing), as previously discussed, is modulated by context during production and processing. The
comprehension and production of a word are achieved through contextual activation (modula-
tion) of its superimposed semantic representation. This is the place where polysemy emerges.
This activated semantic representation is modulated by both the linguistic contexts and non-
linguistic contexts, so different kinds of meaning modulation could all shape the token meaning
of a polysemous word in context, such as enrichment of meaning, linguistic coercion, and so
on. Notice that these modulations occur at the same level as the semantic composition of
word meaning, so polysemy does not involve a second stage of comprehension as in Grice
(1991)’s model. The distribution of contextual modulations determines whether a word is
polysemous and how polysemous it is. The modulations of polysemous words follow a multi-
modal distribution in which multiple dense clusters are formed by similar modulations of the
same polysemous words. These clusters of similar modulated token meanings are entrenched
in one’s memory after exposure and rehearsal, so they are more easily and effortlessly activated
in the future. As a result, clusters of modulations further strengthen the probability of future
modulations lying in the entrenched clusters so that the multimodal distribution is constantly
retained.
In sum, polysemy is neither directly encoded as multiple different senses in a semantic
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representation as in static accounts nor just pure ad-hoc modulation of meaning as suggested in
operational accounts. Instead, polysemy arises from clustering and entrenchment of different
contextual activations (modulations) of a single distributed semantic representation in different
contexts.
2.4 Handling Features of Polysemy with the New Theory
In this section, I briefly summarize how my new theory captures the features proposed in the
first chapter and how my theory explains the difference between polysemy and other context-
sensitivity of meaning.
First, the relatedness between senses is captured by the distance between the sense clus-
ters in the semantic space. Different polysemous senses of a word are closer to each other
than the different readings of a homonym. The structure of senses is captured by the geomet-
ric relationship between the sense clusters in the semantic space, which is further discussed
in the computational modeling in the next chapter. Second, the gradedness of polysemy is
captured by the continuity of meaning modulation in context. Modulation is very fine-grained
and highly sensitive to nuanced details in contexts, so meaning modulation can cover the nu-
anced differences that are not capturable by a static account of polysemy. The flexibility of
polysemy also arises from the continuity of meaning modulation: it allows uses of polysemous
words with in-between senses. Third, the regularity of polysemy is captured by clustering
and entrenchment of meaning modulation. Regular uses of polysemous senses cluster and are
entrenched so that future processing of polysemy will more likely align with the already clus-
tered modulations. Furthermore, regular polysemy can be captured as the geometric structure
of clusters in the semantic space, which is discussed in detail in the next chapter with the help of
computational modeling. Last, the productivity of polysemy is captured by the entrenchment
of the clustering in meaning modulation. Statistical measures of clustering (type frequency,
token frequency, variability) in the semantic space capture the patterns of different clustering
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entrenchments, which contribute to the difference in the productivity of different polysemous
words.
To come at the point another way, the difference between polysemy and other kinds of
semantic context-sensitivity can also be explained in my theory of polysemy. As noted, the
difference between homonymy and polysemy is captured by the distance between emerged
sense clusters in the semantic space. The sense clusters in homonymy have a longer distance
between each other than those in polysemy. The difference between indexicality and polysemy
is explained by the plurality of meaning modulation involved in polysemy. There is no single
mechanism for polysemy as in the parametrized context-sensitivity of Kaplanian indexicality.
Last, the difference between ad-hoc meaning variation and polysemy is explained in terms of
the clustering effects of meaning modulation in context. Ad-hoc meaning variation is usually
one-off without repetitive and sustained uses so it does not cluster in the semantic space and is
not entrenched in our long-term memory. That is why, in contrast to polysemy, ad-hoc meaning
variation does not constitute a part of our literal meaning.
In sum, the modulation of word meaning in context, on the one hand, captures the different
features of polysemous senses. On the other hand, the clustering of modulation provides an
explanation of the regularity and productivity of polysemy with the help of the semantic space.
As a result, this new theory of polysemy provides a way to capture the regularity of polysemy
without losing the flexibility of polysemous meaning. An important consequence of this new
theory is that a constitutive account of what polysemy is lies in, as least partially, the causal
account how polysemous senses arise and are processed because only the causal components
of meaning modulation and entrenched clustering offer an explanation of why polysemy, as a
linguistic phenomenon, has the feature of relatedness, structuredness, gradedness, flexibility,
regularity, and productivity. In the next chapter, the implementation of clustering and mod-
ulation in a computational model provides quantitative measures for empirical confirmation
in both corpus and behavioral studies, which provides further evidence in support of this new
theory of polysemy.
Chapter 3
A Computational Model and Experiments
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we10 implemented the theory of polysemy proposed in the last chapter in a
recurrent neural network (RNN) model to demonstrate this new theory of polysemy and as-
sess it with corpus studies and behavioral experiments. The computational model provides a
source of how different components of the theory work together causally, because the details
of clustering go beyond the scope of verbal description. Second, we plan to collect evidence
for the new theory proposed in Chapter 2 and against the static account of polysemy. The static
account entails a different causal account of how polysemous words are processed, so the com-
putational model could provide evidence in terms of which causal account fits the behavioral
data of polysemy processing better. Third, we want to showcase that connectionist models like
ours can learn rule-like patterns captured by symbolic models, such as the shared patterns in
regular polysemy.
There has already been a large number of semantic models that focus on polysemy. First,
there are distributional semantic models that have proven their capacity to capture semantic
information and psycholinguistic findings (Lenci, 2018). These models range from classical
10This chapter is based on a collaboration with Dr. Marc F. Joanisse.
39
Chapter 3. A ComputationalModel and Experiments 40
versions, such as Latent Semantic Analysis (Deerwester et al., 1990) and Hyperspace Ana-
logue to Language (Burgess, 1998), to contemporary neural network based versions, such as
Word2Vec (Mikolov et al., 2013a) and GloVe (Pennington et al., 2014). Most distributional
semantic models do not distinguish different polysemous senses of a single word because they
abstract each context of each occurrence into a single vector representation as prototype mod-
els (Jones, 2019). Second, there are attractor network models representing polysemous senses
as attractor basins in a high dimensional semantic space (Rodd et al., 2004; Armstrong and
Plaut, 2008, 2016). These attractor models have both the representational aspect of encoding
senses as attractors and the processing aspect of following a trajectory into the basin in the
high dimensional space. However, most attractor networks, such as Hopfield network (Hop-
field, 1984; Hopfield and Tank, 1985), implement point attractors that discretize polysemous
senses, and they use hand-coded meaning vectors rather than learning them in a natural corpus
(Details in the discussion section). Third, there are the examplar models of polysemy, such
as the Instance Theory of Semantic Memory (ITS) (Jamieson et al., 2018). It differs from the
previous two models in that it does not abstract instances of the meaning of each occurrence of
a word, neither into a single word level nor into a polysemous sense level. Instead, this model
stores a representation for each linguistic instance it is exposed to, and the meaning of a word
token is constructed on-the-fly from these stored instances.
We apply Recurrent Neural Network to model this new theory of polysemy, because RNN
implements naturally the idea that the meaning of a word token is modulated by the previous
context (influenced by the previous recurrent layer). Furthermore, RNN represents the context
and the modulated meaning in a continuous way without discretizing contexts as in the attractor
models. In attractor models, the contexts are either biasing one sense or another sense with-
out in-between contexts. The continuous representation of contexts that RNN utilizes enables
us to examine the emergence of the clustering structure of both the contexts and word mean-
ings by focusing on the internal representations the model develops as it processes different
senses of polysemous words. Furthermore, RNNs have been widely used in psycholinguis-
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tics to model language learning and processing (Elman, 1990; Christiansen and Chater, 1999;
Linzen et al., 2016; Futrell et al., 2019). Through exposure to sentences, an RNN can learn
and generate a probability distribution for the next word given a sequence of previous words
P(Wn | W1,W2...Wn−2,Wn−1). This task can be seen as a computational implementation of the
prediction based learning previously mentioned. In this task, a model learns knowledge of
languages to predict incoming words accurately. More specifically, language models imple-
mented by RNNs have been shown to be particularly powerful for learning word meanings
(Elman, 2004, 2009, 2011; Kocmi and Bojar, 2017). Peters et al. (2018) have also shown its
power for learning contextual meanings of words. Besides these studies, our RNN models have
similarities with a particular branch of RNN model called Sentence Gestalt model (McClelland
et al., 1989; Rabovsky et al., 2018; Hoffman et al., 2018). They applied simple recurrent net-
works to directly model sentence processing and concept learnings. Our model could be seen
as a modern version of the sentence gestalt model trained on a larger and more natural corpus.
We also recognize that there are limitations to our choice of models. Our model implements
word meaning based only on distributional information, so there is a traditional worry of the
symbol grounding problem (Harnad, 1990). That is how words connect to things in the word
if there is only co-occurrence based distributional information encoded in the model. We are
aware of this problem, but this is not a problem of our own. Instead, It is a problem for all
models based on distributional semantic information. We do not deny the importance of word-
object referential information in semantics, and contextually driven modulation of meaning
in context is not at odds with utilizing referential information in semantics. It is just that we
have not embedded referential information in our computational model. On the other hand,
implementing this grounded and referential information (McRae, 2004) is possible within our
modeling framework, as shown in Xu et al. (2015)’s work on multimodal recurrent neural
network.
In sum, we apply the RNN model to examine the meaning modulation of polysemous
words and their clustering. By focusing on both the internal representations and the next word
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prediction, which the model develops as it processes polysemous words, we can assess the
new theory proposed in the last chapter with both human-annotated corpora and behavioral
experiments.
3.2 Model Architecture — Long Short-Term Memory
The RNN used here is a Long Short-Term Memory model (Hochreiter and Schmidhuber,
1997), specifically based on Merity et al. (2017)’s version of LSTM because of its good per-
formance in learning linguistic generalizations about individual items within a large corpus of
exemplars. The formulae of LSTM are listed below in Equations (3.1).
it = σ(Wiixt + bii + Whiht−1 + bhi)
ft = σ(Wi f xt + bi f + Wh f ht−1 + bh f )
gt = tanh(Wigxt + big + Whght−1 + bhg)
ot = σ(Wioxt + bio + Whoht−1 + bho)
ct = ft  ct−1 + it  gt








The model is presented with sequences of words forming sentences. At each step, a word
is input to the model, and the model is trained to predict what word follows it by activating
the correct representation of the word that is predicted to follow it. Notably, word prediction
11These are the standard LSTM formulae “where ht is the hidden state at time t, ct is the cell state at time t,
xt is the input at time t, ht−1 is the hidden state of the layer at time t − 1 or the initial hidden state at time 0, and
it, ft, gt, ot are the input, forget, cell, and output gates, respectively.” W and b are connection weights and biases
respectively. σ is the sigmoid activation function,  is the Hadamard product, and tanh is the hyperbolic tangent
activation function. (Paszke et al., 2019)
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is rarely accurate because of the productive nature of language. Thus each predicted output
represents the network’s best guess as to the identity of the following word. By presenting the
network with many sentences over the course of training, it learns to output the corresponding
probability distribution of predicted words in context, reflecting the probabilistic structure of
the corpus that it is trained on. This training task of prediction forces the model to learn
both the generalized semantic representations of words (which are operationalized here as its
distribution in the context of all other words in a corpus) and how word meanings are modulated
by context.
As shown in Fig. 3.1, word inputs and predictions are coded in the model using a localist
scheme on the input and output layers where a single unit is used to uniquely encode each
unique word in the corpus vocabulary. This model also has a 600-unit embedding layer rep-
resenting the context-free meaning of each word presented to it. No single unit in it alone
represents a specific word meaning. Instead, it is the activation pattern of all these 600 units
that represents12 the context-free meaning (type meaning) of each word as a distributed rep-
resentation. Next, a 600-unit recurrent layer that is fully connected with the embedding layer
represents the modulated meaning of each word token in its context (the words before the tar-
get polysemous words in a sentence), and these meanings are also distributedly represented.
The recurrent layer is self-connected and parametrized as in Equations (3.1). The target for the
output layer on each trial is a one-hot localist representation13 denoting the actual next word
in the sequence. Because the actual prediction cannot be achieved at a perfect level, the net-
work ultimately learns to produce a set of softmaxed (3.2) activation levels, at the output, in
which multiple words are predicted to varying degrees of certainty, reflecting the probability
distribution of the next word given previous inputs.
12What we mean by representing here and other places in this chapter is that the activities of layers of units
are operationalized as linguistic meaning in our model. The distributional information captured by these activities
is strictly speaking not meaning, but it is useful for examining the modulation and clustering effects, and hence
providing evidence for my theory of polysemy.
13One hot representation is a vector representation in which only one dimension is number 1 while all other
dimensions are 0. For example, a five dimension one hot vector could be (0, 1, 0, 0, 0) or (1, 0, 0, 0, 0).





600 Unit Recurrent Layer
267,735 Unit Output Layer
600 Unit Embedding Layer
267,735 Unit Input Layer (one hot vector)
Figure 3.1: Model architecture. Texts are presented to the model word-by-word. Each word
is presented individually on the input layer, and the model’s task was to predict the following
word in the sequence, so the input and output layer has the same size as the training vocabulary
(Including 267,735 words. Each different surface form of the “same word” is treated as a
different word. “Walked” and “walk” are treated as separate word tokens.). This was achieved
by passing activation through two intermediary layers, one static and one recurrent.
The model runs sequentially, and therefore it can be unrolled along the temporal dimension
as in Fig. 3.2. At each time step t, a word Wt in a text is fed into the embeddings layer as
an input to activate the context-free semantic representation Et of the word and then Et feeds
into the recurrent layer Rt. The recurrent layer Rt is fed by both the embeddings layer of time
t, Et, and previous recurrent layer of t − 1, Rt−1. Rt represents the context-specific meaning
of word Wt as a modulated activation of the semantic representation Et. For the output layer,
each node represents the probability of a word as the next word, so the activation of the output
layer represents a discrete probability distribution with respect to every possible word at the
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next word position. Each word in a sentence is presented in turn, such that the context-sensitive
recurrent layer is influenced not only by the current input word but also the weighted influence
of prior words in the sentence. An example of this LSTM model processing the sentence “The
electrical power is ... a circuit” is also provided in Fig. 3.2. At the time step 1, the word “The”
is input into the model as W1 and it is “modulated” as R1 but there is no previous context. The
model produces an output O1 as a softmax distribution of the predicted next word. The ground
truth for this prediction is “electrical” so the predicted distribution should peak at “electrical.”
At the time step 2, the second word “electrical” in the sentence is input to the model. The
context-free meaning E2 is modulated to be R2 by the previous context R1 and an output of
next word prediction O2 is produced from R2. The model continuously processes the sentence
one word at a time until it reaches the end of the sentence at time t.
3.3 Model Training
The training corpus used in this model is Wikitext-103 (Merity et al., 2016). It is a collection
of over 100 million word tokens from a set of verified Good and Featured articles (n=28,595)
on Wikipedia. The included articles “have been reviewed by humans and are considered well
written, factually accurate, broad in coverage, neutral in point of view, and stable” (Merity
et al., 2018). The vocabulary of this corpus contains 267,735 words.14 This corpus is already
preprocessed and divided into training, validation, and test sets by Merity et al. (2016). The
validation set is used to check the progress of the model during training, and the test set is used
to test the model when all training is done. Neither the validation nor the test set is used for
model training. The training set contains 28,475 Wikipedia articles of 103 million word tokens.
Both the validation and testing sets contain 60 Wikipedia articles of around 200 thousand word
tokens.
During the model training, the training set was divided into 9322 batches of equal-sized
14Each different surface form of the “same word” is treated as a different word, so “walked” and “walk” are
treated as separate word tokens.
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R3R2R1 Rt-1 Rt
O1 O2 O3 Ot-1 Ot
E1 E2 E3 Et-1 Et
W1 W2 W3 Wt-1 Wt
The electrical power a circuit
electrical power is circuit .
Figure 3.2: Unrolled Architecture depicting how the network represents a temporal sequence of
word inputs, and uses prior information to predict upcoming words (and punctuations). Since
word prediction is imperfect because of the creative and productive nature of language, the
model learns to output a probability distribution of possible next words in a sequence. The
model learns to form internal representations on the Recurrent layer that encode contextual
information about an input word and its preceding inputs in order to maximize accuracy in
predicting subsequent words.
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chunks without random shuffling and the parameters of the model were updated after each
batch is presented. The model was initialized with random weights with uniform distribu-
tions bounded from −0.1 to 0.1 and trained to predict the next word for each word in the set
by adjusting weights using the backpropagation-through-time algorithm. A cross-entropy loss
function (3.4) was used to compute the difference between the predicted next word and the
actual next word in the corpus, so that the model could update its predicted next word proba-
bility distribution in order to maximize the probability of the actual next word. During the first
36 epochs, the model was optimized using the Adam algorithm with 0.001 learning rate. In
the next 32 epochs, average stochastic gradient descent was used to fine-tune the model. We
trained the model until the prediction perplexity (3.3) was no longer decreasing, so the model
could not predict words better. The training was stopped after 68 epochs, at which point the












3.4 Model Assessment with Linguistic Corpora
We first assessed our trained LSTM model against corpus data in terms of the clustering of
meaning modulation. We examined what kinds of clusters emerge and how well these emerged
15In the formula, W represents the target sentence, and w represents each word in the sentence, so the perplexity
of a sentence is defined as the inverse probability of the target sentence, normalized by the number of words. In
general, perplexity is an information theory measure of how well a probability distribution (here, produced by the
trained model) predicts a sample. A low perplexity of language modeling indicates good performance of a model
in predicting words. Because the model is trained to predict the training data, good training leads to assigning high
probability to sentences in the training data (low perplexity). If the model also generalizes well to data unseen
(test data), it should also yield low perplexity for the test data.
16This loss function is the cross entropy combined with the softmax activation. The variable class denotes the
positive class.
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clusters explain the gradedness, structuredness, and regularity of polysemy senses.
3.4.1 Modeling Senses as Clusters in Meaning Modulations
We assessed (1) whether the model had developed internal representations of polysemous word
meanings, (2) how it would process the polysemous word in context to achieve the correct
meaning modulation, and (3) whether the clustering of modulations would match the human
intuition of sense individuation. For each word in the corpus vocabulary, the model learned17
a 600-dimensional vector in the 600-unit embeddings layer, which represents the context-free
meaning or type meaning of a word. In contrast, for each word fed into the model, the model
activated a potentially unique 600-dimensional vector in the recurrent layer as its modulated
meaning in context because the activation is a function of both the previous context and the
context-free meaning of the current input word. Different tokens of the same word will have
different representations within the recurrent layer but not within the embeddings layer. Activa-
tion in the recurrent layer reflects both the information of the previous context and the current
word. In this modeling experiment, we assessed both how the previous context before the tar-
get polysemous word (the recurrent layer at t − 1, t is when the target polysemous is input to
the model) and the target polysemous modulated by the previous context (the recurrent layer at
t) to examine the roles of contexts and context-free word meanings.
In order to probe the learned representation of polysemous words and how polysemy
emerges from meaning modulations during processing, we tested our model against a sense
annotated corpus (Evans and Yuan, 2017) on which our model had not been trained. This cor-
pus is composed of MASC (Passonneau et al., 2012) and SemCor (Mihalcea, 1998) datasets
and manually annotated with sense definitions according to the New Oxford American Dictio-
nary.
17Representation learning is a terminology used in the field of machine learning. It means that, by training
a computational model on a specific task, the model extracts the features useful for the task from the data and
generalizes to data not trained on. Here, we mean the recurrent neural network develops a set of weights so
that given a fragment of a sentence, the model correctly predicts the next word in the sentence. The weights also
produce activations of units in the intermediate layer, as the representation of useful distributional features.
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We fed the corpus into the model as sequences of words and extracted the recurrent layer
at the time of annotated polysemous words as 600-dimensional vectors (activation values of
the units in the recurrent layer), reflecting their modulated meaning in their contexts. We also
extracted the recurrent layer before the annotated polysemous words come in, reflecting the
contexts modulating this target word. With the annotation of senses in the corpus, we obtained
the ground truth distribution of each sense of each polysemous word and sense-biasing context.
To examine the clustering structure of both the meaning modulations and previous con-
texts, we applied unsupervised Gaussian mixture models to cluster the meaning modulation
vectors (recurrent activation at t when the target polysemous word is input) and context vec-
tors (recurrent activation at t − 1). The Gaussian mixture model will find the n most likely
Gaussian distributions underlying the data (the distributions from which the data are sampled
from), so it finds the n mostly likely sense clusters given the contextual token meaning vec-
tors provided to the model. This tested the theory that polysemous senses emerged naturally as
clustered modulations from linguistic processing and these emerged clusters are consistent with
human intuition. We tested quantitatively how accurately these clusters were formed according
to the ground truth annotations in the corpus. The sense clusters were obtained by unsuper-
vised Gaussian mixture modeling of n components (n equals the numbers of senses) with the
Expectation-Maximization algorithm. In order to make the clustering algorithm work prop-
erly18, we randomly sampled the meaning vectors so that there was an equal number of words
belonging to each sense (cf. during training, where sense bias was allowed to reflect what was
present in the training corpus). As a result, each sense cluster obtained was a 600d Gaussian
distribution, and it represented how likely this sense had this particular meaning in a con-
text. We also applied the same Gaussian mixture model to the PCA compressed 2-dimensional
meaning vectors for visualization as shown in Fig. 3.3.
In order to quantitatively test the hypothesis that clustering consistent with human intuition
18Accurately clustering imbalanced datasets is a challenging problem in statistics and machine learning
(Krawczyk, 2016). The standard approach in the field is to preprocess the data to make the dataset balanced.
In order to prevent the clustering algorithm performing poorly and assess the clustering accurately, we prepro-
cessed the data to make them balanced.
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(a) Gaussian Mixture model of “power” (b) Gaussian Mixture Model of “interest”
(c) Distribution of the modulated meaning of
“power”
(d) Distribution of the modulated of “interest”
Figure 3.3: The first two pictures are plotted according to the annotation in the corpus. The
second two pictures present the result of the unsupervised Gaussian mixture model with blue
contours representing bivariate Gaussian distributions. Each Gaussian distribution represents
a sense of the word. The darkness of blue represents the probability density of the Gaussian
distribution. So the darker the blue is, the more probable the word of this sense will have this
particular modulated meaning.
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emerges in both the previous contexts and the target polysemous word meanings modulated by
context, we applied permutation tests19 in which we compared the model’s clustering accuracy
(compared with the ground truth label derived from the annotated corpus mentioned previ-
ously) to a random distribution of labels, allowing us to test the hypothesis that sense clusters
consistent with human intuition emerge in our model. We sampled a set of random labels for
each polysemous word, and retrieved two sets of labels created by the Gaussian mixture model
for the target polysemous word and previous context. Then we calculated the accuracy of these
two pairs of labels against the ground truth annotations in the corpus using V-measure (Rosen-
berg and Hirschberg, 2007)20 We repeated this process 5000 times for item and performed a
Welch’s t-test to compare these accuracy distributions of the clustered labels and the random
labels. The accuracy scores of both the clustering of polysemous words and previous contexts
are all significantly above chance (p < 0.001). From the result in Table 3.1, we can see that
polysemous words with senses dissimilar to each other had higher accuracy in clustering, while
lower accuracy is among words with senses very similar to each other.
19In permutation tests, we simply run the clustering algorithms n times to acquire the distribution of clustering
accuracy so that we can test whether the obtained result is a chance or reflects some real pattern.
20The upper bound of V-measure is 1, suggesting a perfect matching with the ground truth clustering labeling,
and 0 is as bad as it can be.
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Words n(Senses) n(Tokens) Mean(Random) Mean(Context) t p Mean(Target) t p
right 2 54 0.01(0.01) 0.54(0.26) -138.33596 < 0.01∗ 0.57(0.23) -165.7140002 < 0.01∗
way 2 306 0.00(0.00) 0.29(0.05) -399.2738453 < 0.01∗ 0.20(0.05) -264.0938988 < 0.01∗
man 2 256 0.00(0.00) 0.47(0.07) -418.2969306 < 0.01∗ 0.44(0.04) -691.0091362 < 0.01∗
life 3 150 0.01(0.00) 0.12(0.03) -194.5065742 < 0.01∗ 0.09(0.03) -172.4208147 < 0.01∗
problem 2 24 0.03(0.04) 0.13(0.12) -58.4666684 < 0.01∗ 0.14(0.11) -66.22472595 < 0.01∗
case 3 24 0.09(0.06) 0.29(0.11) -109.1536451 < 0.01∗ 0.29(0.09) -123.4706991 < 0.01∗
school 2 24 0.03(0.04) 0.12(0.13) -44.63753452 < 0.01∗ 0.09(0.11) -36.56969444 < 0.01∗
head 3 36 0.05(0.04) 0.71(0.10) -410.0651209 < 0.01∗ 0.71(0.09) -448.5218042 < 0.01∗
country 2 34 0.02(0.03) 0.13(0.13) -55.34390305 < 0.01∗ 0.13(0.13) -58.62186267 < 0.01∗
company 3 33 0.06(0.04) 0.30(0.13) -115.3920944 < 0.01∗ 0.31(0.13) -127.4535993 < 0.01∗
room 2 42 0.01(0.02) 0.47(0.26) -121.2398073 < 0.01∗ 0.43(0.26) -109.4820975 < 0.01∗
figure 3 30 0.06(0.05) 0.36(0.13) -145.6454068 < 0.01∗ 0.42(0.13) -178.7518013 < 0.01∗
power 3 42 0.04(0.03) 0.31(0.13) -139.2664879 < 0.01∗ 0.38(0.11) -205.3802755 < 0.01∗
interest 3 75 0.02(0.01) 0.33(0.11) -181.6764711 < 0.01∗ 0.27(0.09) -182.2931466 < 0.01∗
building 2 42 0.01(0.02) 0.24(0.21) -74.45572442 < 0.01∗ 0.29(0.23) -81.24912504 < 0.01∗
term 2 68 0.01(0.01) 0.19(0.14) -89.84207278 < 0.01∗ 0.14(0.11) -72.21249896 < 0.01∗
film 2 18 0.04(0.06) 0.26(0.16) -89.88498736 < 0.01∗ 0.27(0.13) -86.4059051 < 0.01∗
date 2 18 0.04(0.06) 0.24(0.20) -64.81268349 < 0.01∗ 0.27(0.22) -74.69170083 < 0.01∗
issue 2 28 0.02(0.03) 0.13(0.12) -59.33096106 < 0.01∗ 0.14(0.16) -58.1165849 < 0.01∗
matter 3 33 0.06(0.04) 0.43(0.18) -141.7609424 < 0.01∗ 0.39(0.16) -131.9548785 < 0.01∗
back 2 78 0.00(0.01) 0.22(0.16) -94.4371559 < 0.01∗ 0.21(0.1) -104.0218819 < 0.01∗
world 2 194 0.00(0.00) 0.03(0.04) -45.91502646 < 0.01∗ 0.02(0.00) -49.7401746 < 0.01∗
point 4 28 0.14(0.06) 0.39(0.10) -149.2831587 < 0.01∗ 0.44(0.19) -166.9493663 < 0.01∗
system 2 182 0.00(0.00) 0.12(0.08) -107.9401929 < 0.01∗ 0.12(0.00) -209.4022598 < 0.01∗
hand 2 26 0.03(0.04) 0.10(0.08) -52.29789509 < 0.01∗ 0.09(0.03) -47.85721836 < 0.01∗
form 3 87 0.02(0.01) 0.32(0.11) -175.9811898 < 0.01∗ 0.34(0.08) -226.2852028 < 0.01∗
office 2 42 0.01(0.02) 0.11(0.11) -62.64026067 < 0.01∗ 0.10(0.05) -59.55746128 < 0.01∗
position 3 42 0.04(0.03) 0.26(0.10) -134.381395 < 0.01∗ 0.27(0.18) -132.2234076 < 0.01∗
Table 3.1: Clusters of Polysemous senses. Standard deviation of all means is shown in paren-
theses.
Both the meaning modulations of the target polysemous words and contexts before the tar-
get words are significantly similar to the ground truth human intuition of sense individuations.
This means that meaningful clustering emerges in both of them. However, this does not mean
that both of them are polysemous senses of words. According to this new theory, contexts mod-
ulate the target word meaning into different contextual meanings. It is the modulating contexts
that make the modulated meanings different, but it is the target word being modulated that pulls
these contextual meanings together to be relevant as the polysemous senses. In sum, clustering
emerges in both the previous contexts of polysemous words and the modulated target word
meanings, but it is the modulated meanings that are the polysemous senses.
In order to distinguish the roles of previous contexts and modulated word meanings, we
measured the similarity between the modulated meanings of target words and context-free
meaning of the target words and also the similarity between previous contexts of target words
and context-free meaning of the target words. The similarity was computed as the euclidean
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distance between these two vectors. The context-free meanings of a word were extracted from
the recurrent layers when nothing but the target words were input into the previously trained
model. Hence, there were no previous contexts modulating the target word meanings. The
modulated meanings of target words and the previous contexts of target words were extracted
in the same way as the recurrent layers when and before the target words are input. The result
was shown in Table 3.2. The distances between modulated meaning and context-free meaning
(M = 4.49, S D = 0.09) were significantly smaller than the distances between the previous
context and context-free meaning (M = 6.49, S D = 0.05), t(50) = −27.9, p < .01. This
suggests that modulated meanings in context are more suitable than the previous contexts as
the polysemous senses because different polysemous senses of a word have to be the sense of
and relevant to this word. As a result, both the contexts before the target word and the target
word itself work together to create the phenomena of polysemy. The modulating contexts
initiate clustering. The modulated target word ensures its different modulations relevant as the
polysemous senses.
3.4.2 Modeling Regular Polysemy as Evidenced by Geometric Patterns
between Clusters
Next, we tested whether our model captured the pattern of regular polysemy. Regular polysemy
is a subcategory of polysemous words sharing patterns with other polysemous words so that
their senses follow a similar sense pattern. A formal definition of regular polysemy was first
given by Apresjan (1974).
“Polysemy of the word A with the meanings ai and a j is called regular if, in the
given language, there exists at least one other word B with the meanings bi and b j,
which are semantically distinguished from each other in exactly the same way as
ai and a j and if ai and bi, a j and b j are nonsynonymous.”
Regular polysemy is exemplified by words like “bottle” and “can.” Both of them have the
Chapter 3. A ComputationalModel and Experiments 54





























Table 3.2: Similarity between context-free meaning and modulated meaning of the target word
and similarity between context-free meaning and previous context of the target word. Measured
by Euclidean Distance in the semantic space.
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container and the content sense as in (1)/(2) and (3)/(4). And these two senses have similar
uses in “bottle” and “can.”
(1) This bottle tastes better.
(2) This bottle is fragile.
(3) I ate a whole can.
(4) I threw out an empty can.
Traditionally, people explain regular polysemy by positing some kinds of explicit structures
into their semantic representations as in the static accounts. These structures are accordingly
shared by polysemous words in the same category, which explains the regularity of such pat-
terns. However, regular polysemy poses a problem for most operational accounts of polysemy
because these accounts do not posit explicit structures in the semantic representation, and they
see polysemy as a phenomenon of semantic/pragmatic operation. Therefore, this requires an
extra explanation of why these meaning modulations are regular and shared by other polyse-
mous words in the same category.
We argue that the structure of regular polysemy also emerges from the processing and pro-
duction of polysemous words instead of being directly and statically encoded in their semantic
representations. In our model of polysemy, the activation patterns in the embedding layer
is a weighted superimposition of different contexutal modulated activation in the recurrent
layer. And the connection weights between the embedding layer and the hidden layer store the
probabilistic knowledge of how polysemous words are modulated in different contexts. Some
patterns of meaning modulations occur more frequently so they are more entrenched in the
connection weights (long term memory) to facilitate future processing. As a result, meaning
modulations follow these regular patterns through entrenchment and the regularity of these
patterns can be assessed by analyzing the geometric relationships between modulated mean-
ing in the semantic space, which is similar to the word analogy relationship discovered in
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natural language processing research (Mikolov et al., 2013b). For example, the regularity of
CONTENT-CONTAINER polysemy can be captured by the vector from bottlecontainer modu-
lations to bottlecontent modulations being parallel to the vector from cancontainer modulations to
cancontent modulations.
In order to test our LSTM model, we used an annotated corpus of regular polysemy (Alonso,
2013) that includes five categories of regular polysemy: ANIMAL-MEAT e.g., “chicken” as
in “raise a chicken” and “eat chicken,” ARTICLE-INFORMATION e.g., “book” as in “buy
a book” and “revise a book,” CONTAINER-CONTENT e.g., “glass” as in “break a glass”
and “finish a glass,” LOCATION-ORGANIZATION such as “Canada” in “went to Canada”
and “Canada negotiated a treaty,” PROCESS-RESULT such as “construction” in “finish the
construction” and “a rigid construction.” Each category includes 500 sentences with regular
polysemous words annotated as, for example, ARTICLE or INFORMATION sense. We fed
this regular polysemy corpus as sequences of words into the LSTM model pre-trained on the
Wikitext-103 corpus. As such, the LSTM model had not seen this regular polysemy corpus
during the training and was instead asked to generalize what it had learned to these novel
sentences. We extracted the hidden activity patterns of each annotated polysemous word as
a 600-dimensional vector, which represents the modulated meaning of this word token in its
context. Then we averaged the vectors of the same sense to be the word’s sense vector and
defined the sense pattern of a polysemous word to be the vector from its one averaged sense to
the other averaged sense.
Ideally, polysemous words belonging to the same category have parallel sense patterns with
each other as in Fig. 3.4, which are two successful cases captured by our model. In Fig. 3.4,
each dot is a 2d projection (2 highest-ranked dimensions by PCA) of a 600d vector averaged
from meaning modulations of one sense. The line segments connecting these dots represent
the sense patterns of different regular polysemous words. We see similar sense patterns among
regular polysemy in both LOC-ORG and ART-INFO in terms of their angles. So ~VChinaLOC −
~VChinaORG ≈ ~VEnglandLOC − ~VEnglandORG ≈ ~VGermanyLOC − ~VGermanyORG ≈ ~VCanadaLOC − ~VCanadaORG and
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similar relationship holds for ARTICLE-INFORMATION regular polysemy.
(a) Regular Polysemy of LOCATION-
ORGANIZATION
(b) Regular Polysemy of ARTICLE-
INFORMATION
Figure 3.4: Regular polysemy modeled as geometric relations between clusters. Each dot rep-
resents the mean of a word sense’s meaning cluster. Each line denotes a two-dimensional sim-
plification of the multidimensional relationship between the two senses of each word. Similar-
direction lines suggest a common type of relatedness among different word pairs, reflecting
sense regularity. We quantified this regularity by computing the angle of each pair of word
senses in high-dimensional space, and then computed the degree of variability in this angle,
where highly regular patterns should be reflected in very low degrees of variability among
sense pairs.
For hypothesis testing, we calculated the sense pattern of each polysemous word in the
corpus. For the sense pattern of each word, we calculated the angle between itself and that
of another word in the same category (for example, the angle between the sense pattern of
“England” and the sense pattern of “Germany”) on the one hand, and the angle between itself
and that of a word out of the same category (for example, the angle between the sense pattern
of “England” and the sense pattern of “line”) on the other. This process was repeated for 15000
times as a permutation test. If the angles are significantly smaller within the same category than
out of the same category, it serves as evidence that our model captures polysemy regularity.
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Category Within Category Means Out of Category Means t p
ANIMAL&MEAT 86.49(10.85) 89.64(4.20) -33.17 < 0.01∗
CONTAINER&CONTENT 93.32(13.11) 90.22(5.01) 27.06 > 0.99
LOCATION&ORGANIZATION 77.06(14.60) 90.11(3.96) -105.59 < 0.01∗
ARTICLE&INFORMATION 68.87(9.48) 90.17(4.81) -245.33 < 0.01∗
PROCESS&RESULT 90.56(12.14) 89.93(4.08) 6.01 > 0.99
Table 3.3: Result of permutation test of regular polysemy
Among the five categories of regular polysemy, three had significantly smaller within-
category angles than out-of-category angles, which shows that regular polysemous words within
these categories share similar patterns. This serves as preliminary evidence that regular sense
patterns emerge from the linguistic processing as the geometric relationship between clusters of
modulated meanings in context, here as the degree of the angle. It shows that our connectionist
model captures rule-like patterns of regular polysemous words without explicit supervision.
The other two categories don’t show significant similar patterns. We propose that this
reflects the fact that our model only captures the context before the polysemy word, hence only
W1 to Wt−1 but not Wt+1 (and the following), so the modulation of the polysemous words has
to be reached in the previous contexts in our model. This would predict that certain types of
polysemy regularity are captured during online processing in which contextual cues regularly
occur prior to word presentation (e.g., LOCATION-ORGANIZATION), whereas other types of
regularities reflect offline judgments that are largely meta-linguistic and thus not well captured
within a processing-based model like the present one. It could also be that the regularity of
polysemy is much more complicated than parallel relationships between sense patterns. We
suggest that further research should be done.
3.5 Model Assessment with Behavioral Experiments
In this section, we assessed our trained LSTM model with human behavioral data — offline
ratings, eye-tracking data, and reaction time of priming tasks. We tested how well our trained
model captured the sense relatedness and the behavioral characteristics of polysemy.
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3.5.1 Modeling Sense Relatedness Ratings
We tested our model in terms of how well it captures previous behavioral findings. We first
calculated polysemous senses similarity from our previously trained RNN model and compared
it with Klepousniotou et al. (2008)’s empirical sense rating data.
In Klepousniotou et al. (2008)’s study, they selected 72 polysemous words as their stimuli.
Each word was accompanied by four modifiers divided into two senses. For example, “admis-
sion” was accompanied by “movie,” “concert,” “guilty,” and “false.” The first two modifier-
word pairs suggest the sense of the entering process, while the last two suggest the sense of
acknowledging truth. They collected the empirical semantic overlap ratings between the two
senses suggested by the modifiers. This provided a rating of 1 to 5 (1 = low overlap, 5 = high
overlap). Words like “admission” in “movie admission” or “guilty admission” were rated low
since these two senses of “admission” have low overlap and relatedness. High overlap words
included words like “book” as in “best-selling book” or “heavy book.”
For the simulation, we preprocessed Klepousniotou et al. (2008)’s data by deleting one
polysemous word “key” because one of its modifiers “backspace” does not exist in our model
training data. Hyphenated words like ’best-selling’ were coded as two words (e.g., “best-
selling” was coded as “best selling”), reflecting the format of our training data. Then we input
all the polysemous words preceded by each of their four modifiers into our trained RNN model
and collected the vector of hidden layer activation when the polysemous word was input. For
each polysemous word, we collected four vectors of two different senses. We then averaged
the two vectors belonging to the same sense and calculated the cosine similarity between the
two average vectors.
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Figure 3.5: Scatterplot of the correlation between model produced cosine similarity and human
rated relatedness of polysemous words
We calculated the correlation between the model generated cosine similarity and the human
relatedness ratings. There was a positive correlation between these two variables, r = 0.37, p 6
0.001, n = 71. A scatterplot summarizes the result (Fig. 3.5). As a result, our model captured
the polysemous sense relatedness from learning a natural corpus of English texts to a moderate
degree.
We are aware that this is not a very strong effect. There could be multiple reasons. First,
there are only two contexts for each sense, and the context modulating the polysemous target
word in Klepousniotou et al. (2008)’s dataset is only one word long. It may not be enough
for the model to reach a complete modulation as the polysemous sense that human raters are
thinking of. The correlation could be improved if we use longer contexts or more contexts to
modulate the target polysemous word. Second, our model was trained on one set of experiences
(Wikitext-103) that resembled some aspects of how a language learner encounters English but
clearly not everything. It is reasonable to expect the model will approximate knowledge, but
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closer approximations could be captured if its experiences more closely matched the variety
of utterances/sentences a person experiences over their lifetime. Third, there is no referential
or multimodal information in our training data. Distributional information only explains one
aspect of linguistic meaning.
3.5.2 Modeling Online Sentence Processing of Polysemy
Next, we tested how well our model captured the behavioral findings of previous sentence
processing tasks of polysemy. There is a large literature in computational linguistics and psy-
cholinguistics discussing the relationship between reading times and word probability given
previous contexts (Hale, 2001; Ferreira and Henderson, 1990; Altmann et al., 1992). It is
known that if a word is predicted to be more likely in context, it is read faster in human sentence
processing. Here, we simulated the sentence processing of polysemy in Foraker and Murphy
(2012)’s self-paced reading and eye-tracking study based on the log probability produced by
our model’s prediction.
Foraker and Murphy investigated the reading time of disambiguating phrases of polyse-
mous words in both biasing contexts and neutral contexts. In neutral contexts, participants
read sentences like “they discussed the cotton after the fabric ripped/crop failed a second time,”
where the meaning of “cotton” was neutral between the crop and fabric until the disambiguat-
ing phrase “fabric ripped/crop failed” appear. In biasing contexts, participants read sentences
like “the fashion designers/the farm owners discussed the cotton after the fabric ripped/crop
failed a second time.” “Fashion designers” biased the interpretation of “cotton” towards the
fabric sense, while “farm owners” biased it towards the crop sense. The disambiguating phrase
“fabric ripped/crop failed” might either be consistent or inconsistent with the biasing context.
We used the same stimuli in Foraker and Murphy (2012)’s Experiment 2 and 3. They con-
sisted of 25 items, and each item had three contexts — neutral, dominant, and subordinate and
two disambiguating phrases — dominant and subordinate, so there was a total of six conditions
for each item (see Table 3.4). The main goal of the simulation was to test whether our model
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captured the same human behavioral effects: that disambiguating phrases were read faster in
consistent conditions (dominant context and dominant disambiguating phrase or subordinate
context and subordinate disambiguating phrase). And dominant disambiguating phrases were
read slightly faster compared to subordinate disambiguating phrases in neutral contexts.
Context Sense Completion Sentence
Dominant Dominant The fashion designers discussed the cotton after the fabric ripped a second time.
Dominant Subordinate The fashion designers discussed the cotton after the crop failed a second time.
Subordinate Dominant The farm owners discussed the cotton after the fabric ripped a second time.
Subordinate Subordinate The farm owners discussed the cotton after the crop failed a second time.
Neutral Dominant They discussed the cotton after the fabric ripped a second time.
Neutral Subordinate They discussed the cotton after the crop failed a second time.
Table 3.4: Materials of sentence processing in Foraker and Murphy’s study
We input each item into the previously trained RNN model as six sentences in six different
conditions and applied a log-softmax function to the output layer activation before the target
disambiguating phrase was input in order to extract the conditional log probability of the target
phrase being predicted given the previous contexts. If the disambiguating phrase had more than
one word, we summed the conditional log probabilities of each disambiguating word as the log
probability of the disambiguating phrase.







Table 3.5: Result of sentence processing simulation. Standard deviation of all means is shown
in parentheses.
The summary of the simulation result is shown in Table 3.5. We applied a repeated-
measures 3 × 2 ANOVA to analyze the result (Table 3.6). Mauchly’s test indicated that the
assumption of sphericity had been violated for the main effects of Context, W = 0.769, p < .05,
and Context-Target Interaction, W = 0.650, p < .001. Therefore, degrees of freedom were cor-
rected using Greenhouse–Geisser estimates of sphericity. There was a significant main context
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effect, F(1.6, 38.4) = 3.55, p < 0.05, and a significant interaction effect between the type of
context and the type of disambiguating target, F(1.36, 32.64) = 11.38, p < 0.001, which was
similar in Foraker and Murphy (2012)’s study.
Effect DFn DFd F p
Context 2 48 3.56 0.04∗
Target 1 24 0.25 0.63
Context:Target 2 48 11.32 < 0.001∗
Table 3.6: Result of repeated-measures ANOVA of sentence processing simulation
Tukey post hoc tests (Table 3.7) revealed that disambiguating phrases of dominant senses
were more probable following dominant contexts than subordinate contexts, t(92) = 3.124, p <
0.05. Disambiguating phrases of subordinate senses were less probable following dominant
contexts than subordinate contexts, t(92) = −4.268, p < 0.001. However, we did not find the
significant difference between the dominant and subordinate disambiguating phrases in neutral
contexts, t(24.7) = 0.516, p = 0.9950.
Contrast Conditions Estimate SE DF t p
DominantDominant - NeutralDominant 0.32199 0.115 92.0 2.811 0.0646
DominantDominant - SubordinateDominant 0.35777 0.115 92.0 3.124 0.0280*
DominantDominant - DominantSubordinate 0.84090 0.862 24.7 0.976 0.9214
DominantDominant - NeutralSubordinate 0.76643 0.860 24.5 0.891 0.9451
DominantDominant - SubordinateSubordinate 0.35208 0.860 24.5 0.409 0.9983
NeutralDominant - SubordinateDominant 0.03578 0.115 92.0 0.312 0.9996
NeutralDominant - DominantSubordinate 0.51891 0.860 24.5 0.603 0.9898
NeutralDominant - NeutralSubordinate 0.44444 0.862 24.7 0.516 0.9950
NeutralDominant - SubordinateSubordinate 0.03009 0.860 24.5 0.035 1.0000
SubordinateDominant - DominantSubordinate 0.48313 0.860 24.5 0.562 0.9926
SubordinateDominant - NeutralSubordinate 0.40866 0.860 24.5 0.475 0.9966
SubordinateDominant - SubordinateSubordinate -0.00569 0.862 24.7 -0.007 1.0000
DominantSubordinate - NeutralSubordinate -0.07447 0.115 92.0 -0.650 0.9867
DominantSubordinate - SubordinateSubordinate -0.48882 0.115 92.0 -4.268 0.0007*
NeutralSubordinate - SubordinateSubordinate -0.41435 0.115 92.0 -3.618 0.0063*
Table 3.7: Result of post hoc analysis of sentence processing simulation
In sum, we found the consistent effects that polysemous words are processed faster in con-
sistent contexts than inconsistent context. We did not find the dominance effect that following
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neutral contexts, polysemous words in dominant senses are read faster than subordinate senses.
However, this dominance effect in neutral contexts has been a controversial effect. Frisson
(2015) replicated Foraker and Murphy (2012)’s sentence processing experiments but failed to
find the significant difference in reading times between dominant and subordinate sense fol-
lowing neutral context as us. Therefore, our model failing to replicate the dominance effect
could be due to that this dominance effect is itself small. Moreover, a danger of computational
simulation is overfitting a single set of findings which may themselves not be good estimates
of population behavior, so it is better that our model successfully simulated the more robust
finding — consistency effect rather than the less robust dominance effect.
3.6 Comparison with Other Models of Polysemy
In this section, we discuss our model of polysemy in comparison with other related models.
We first compare our model with other connectionist models of polysemy (Rodd et al., 2004;
Armstrong and Plaut, 2008, 2016; Rodd, 2020), then discuss the connection of our model with
an exemplar model of language processing and acquisition (Jamieson et al., 2018; Ambridge,
2019).
Rodd et al. (2004)’s and Armstrong and Plaut (2008, 2016)’s models are attractor networks.
Attractors networks are highly interconnected networks, whose activity will settle into a stable
state after a period of time. Basically, their models have a layer of orthography representing
the word form of polysemous words and another layer of semantics representing the senses of
polysemy. These two layers are connected so that a word form can activate its word meaning.
Attractor network modelers train their models until the semantic layer learns to settle into
the correct senses. Thus, their models present how semantic activation of polysemous words
unfolds in the temporal dimension.
There are a lot of similarities in spirit between attractor models of polysemy and our model.
We all recognize the importance of context and how it modulates the activation of stored poly-
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semous word meaning in context. And the entrenchment of clustering very likely form attrac-
tors in the activation of polysemous word meanings in the recurrent layer to constrain possible
polysemous word meanings.
However, we do want to point out some difference between our model and attractor network
models of polysemy that is theoretically meaningful. First, our model represents contexts
differently. Our model represents contexts as a sequence of words before the target polysemous
word so it can represent a wide range of different contexts. In contrast, attractor network models
represent contexts in a discrete way as context units in 3.8 representing either context biasing
one sense (01) or another sense (10).
Second, our model represents polysemous senses differently. In an attractor network model,
a polysemous word form is directly mapped on to multiple discrete sense representations as in
Table 3.8. The two senses are represented as two binary vectors overlapping in some dimen-
sions, which corresponds to the relatedness among senses. This creates a distinct boundary
between different senses of one word. By contrast, in our model, these quasi-discrete senses
emerge as the clusters of contextual modulations of the activated word meaning, instead of
being statically encoded as the word meaning or being represented as any particular activation
in the model. To put more specifically, each instance of a word is represented as a discrete pat-
tern of activation across many units. However, this exact pattern of activation varies somewhat
from one instance to another because of the difference in the modulating contexts. Differences
in word senses occur as a result of these individual senses forming quasi-regular clusters in
activation space. The distance and strength of the boundary between each of these clusters
reflect the relative distinctness of these competing word senses. These quasi-discrete senses
can be quantified as Gaussian clusters by unsupervised Gaussian mixture modeling as in the
result section. So in one sense, our model can be seen as a more detailed implementation of
Rodd et al. (2004)’s and Armstrong and Plaut (2008, 2016)’s models, in which the discrete
sense vectors in Table 3.8 from their models could be seen as a simplification of our model
of polysemy and describing higher-level emergent characteristics of polysemous senses. Cru-
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Item type Orthography Context Semantics
Polysemous 0010 10 000000001111000000000
0010 01 000000000111100000000
Table 3.8: Discrete polysemy representations in attractor networks. Representations are coded
using binary units of 1 or 0. Polysemy is coded as an identical orthographic code (0010)
mapping onto two different but overlapping semantic codes, differentiated via a set of context
features that condition the recognition of one or another. Adapted from Armstrong and Plaut
(2016).
cially though, there is no absolute distinction between different senses of a polysemous word
— the distinction emerges only as a result of differences in terms of how words are modulated
in context, where the contextual modulations of words vary in the extent to which they form
quasi-discrete clusters in multidimensional distributional space. Third, this difference of rep-
resentation leads to the potential difference between the attractors in attractor network models
and our LSTM model. The attractors in attractors network models are point attractors so a
new activation is attracted to one of many discrete point attractors depending on the context.
However, in our LSTM model, the attractors are not points but cloud-like clusters. A particular
activation of a polysemous sense in context can be any point in the cloud depending on the
nuances in contextual difference. As a result, our model could represent the nuance between
the same senses of a word in a slightly different context.
Third, our model explains polysemy from the perspective of emergentism — how quasi-
discrete senses emerge from contextually-driven meaning modulation. Polysemous senses are
not statically encoded in the lexical entry but learned without supervision from a large English
corpus21 instead of artificially hand-coding them as in Rodd et al. (2004)’s and Armstrong and
Plaut (2008, 2016)’s model.
In terms of the different psycholinguistic predictions between these previous models and
ours, their models focus on the temporal dimensions of semantic activation i.e., the tendency for
words to vary in their speed of recognition as a result of activity settling into a stable activation
pattern. Polysemous words have a different profile of semantic activation from homonyms
21This corpus does not represent the current status of English fully but it provides a snapshot of an important
style of written English and also includes a wide range of topics.
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and monosemous words, which is called polysemy advantage. So their models capture this
polysemy advantage of semantic activation (Rodd et al., 2002; Klepousniotou and Baum, 2007)
in the single word lexical decision task. Instead, our model processes polysemous words within
the context of full sentences, so it can yield predictions of human polysemy processing in
the context of sentences (Foraker and Murphy, 2012) as shown in the section of simulating
polysemy processing. For example, sentence contexts can constrain recognition in a way that
can enhance or attenuate ambiguity effects (McRae et al., 1998). Furthermore, our model could
indirectly predict the priming effect for polysemous phrases in the sensicality judgment task
(Klein and Murphy, 2001; Klepousniotou et al., 2008) based on the sense similarity produced
as shown in the section of simulating sense relatedness ratings.
Continuous with comparisons, we want to discuss the relationship between our model of
polysemy with Jamieson et al. (2018); Ambridge (2019)’s exemplar model of language ac-
quisition and processing. Jamieson and Ambridge argue that listeners do not store abstract
linguistic representations such as abstract type meanings or senses. Instead, they maintain rep-
resentations of every exposed exemplar, and thus process and produce language on the fly by
analogy with stored exemplars.
Our theory shares some commonalities with Jamieson’s and Ambridge’s exemplar models.
We both recognize the difficulty of drawing a clear-cut boundary between different senses
to delineate an appropriate abstract sense representation, as Ambridge points out, “it is not
possible to posit abstractions that delineate possible and impossible form; ... that ... rule in pool
tables and data tables, but rule out chairs.” We point this out in the section that summarizes
previous theories, and we both recognized the importance of exemplars in language processing,
as we argue that abstract and discrete senses are metalinguistic clusters of meaning modulations
of word exemplars. Each instance of a polysemous word is processed individually and hence
modulated by its own context. Polysemous senses as abstract and discrete entities are not
directly stored or represented in our linguistic processing. Instead, they are metalinguistic
features from different modulations of individual words.
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However, our approach is not as radical as the one put forward by Jamieson et al. (2018),
which rejects any abstraction in semantic theorizing. We still reserve an abstract representation
for each word as the superimposition of all its different meanings, which serves as the base for
meaning modulation in context, so that constraints for possible modulations of this word can
be learned, stored, and exercised on polysemy processing in the future. That is, recognizing a
new word in context is not the process of matching it against all prior experiences. Instead, its
computation is achieved through weighted connections that are established/abstracted through
these prior experiences. As a result, we recognize the importance of exemplars, particularly
in polysemy representation and processing, but we still retain a minimal amount of abstraction
for polysemy.
3.7 Conclusion
This computational modeling of polysemy implements the two essential causal components of
the new theory of polysemy: meaning modulation in context and entrenched clustering. The
meaning modulation by context is realized by the recurrent layer, whose activation is modulated
by the previous context. The clustering effect is obtained by statistical analysis on the internal
representations extracted from the recurrent layer representing the same polysemous words
in different contexts. These causal components provide a causal account of how polysemy
emerges from linguistic communication and processing. They also constitute what polysemy
is as the new theory of polysemy proposed in Chapter 2 argues that a word is polysemous if
and only if the meaning modulation of this word has entrenched clusters.
The clusters obtained in the model are examined against our intuitive individuation of
polysemous senses through a sense-annotated corpus. Furthermore, the geometric relations
among these clusters are examined with another sense-annotated corpus of regularly polyse-
mous words. Both analyses suggest that abstract internal representations within this model
nevertheless match the polysemous features of graded, flexible, but structured sense individu-
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ation. Furthermore, we simulated an offline polysemy relatedness rating study and an online
sentence processing study and assessed how well our model captured these behavioral data.
These analyses provide positive evidence that the new theory of polysemy proposed in Chapter
2 captures important features of polysemy and polysemy processing.
In terms of the limitation of our modeling, it is clear that humans use a richer and more
grounded set of information about semantics derived from sensory and referential information
(e.g., sensory and functional features, (Cree et al., 1999)) than our model. Our model does not
preclude this perspective, and this richer set of information could be easily incorporated into
the model, for instance, by encoding word representations using feature information. Although
this may serve to improve the realism of the model, we are struck by the degree to which our
simulation captures the target phenomena using only distributional information about word
co-occurrence.
As a final remark, our model belongs to the category of connectionist or neural network
models of semantics. However, we do not intend our models to be a competition to symbolic
theories to semantics. We think connectionist models capture the same semantic knowledge as
symbolic models but in different size of grain. This difference results from the fact that con-
nectionist models learn the rule-like knowledge from the linguistic data directly instead of the
theorizing from human experts. As shown in the experiments of modeling regular polysemy,
our model learned and captured the rule-like regular patterns of polysemy, such as LOCATION-
ORGANIZATION of country names. This result supports how we view our model of polysemy
as a connectionist model.
Chapter 4
Philosophical Implications of Polysemy
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I discuss the philosophical implications of polysemy and my theory of poly-
semy proposed in the previous chapters. I first situate polysemy within the debate between
semantic minimalism and contextualism in philosophy of language and focus on what poly-
semy contributes to the debate. I argue that polysemy poses a serious problem for semantic
minimalism because it only allows a very limited range of context-sensitivity in the literal truth
conditions of an utterance, with which polysemy does not fit well. On the other hand, my
theory of polysemy, which provides a solution to this problem, fits well within contextualism.
4.2 Background for the Debate between Minimalism and Con-
textualism
There is no doubt that contexts contribute a lot to what is meant in an utterance, but my question
is how much contextual contribution belongs to the literal meaning of an utterance. Hence,
the debate between minimalism and contextualism is focused on the context-sensitivity of the
literal truth condition of an utterance. Grice (1991) first distinguishes what is said and what
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is implicated by an utterance. While an utterance can convey an open-ended possibility of
information through what is implicated, Grice claims that what is said by an utterance is tightly
constrained and closely related to the conventional meaning of the expression uttered so that
what is said can be separated from what is implicated in context. This idea that a minimal
truth-condition of an utterance can be isolated from other highly contextual meanings of this
utterance is further developed by semantic minimalists such as Cappelen and Lepore (2008),
Borg (2012), and Devitt (2013). They claim that contexts only contribute what is called the
minimal proposition (or minimal truth condition). Hence,
(1) a truth-evaluative minimal proposition can be recovered from an utterance as soon
as the values of grammatically triggered context-sensitive expressions are assigned, and
ambiguous words are disambiguated.
These grammatically triggered context-sensitive expressions include indexical, such as “I”
and “now,” demonstratives, such as “this” and “those,” and other similar constructions, and
they form the set called the Basic Set of Context-Sensitive Expressions (Cappelen and Lepore,
2008). Semantic minimalists do not deny the context-sensitive roles of these grammatically
triggered expressions. The truth-conditional contribution of the expressions in the basic set,
such as indexicals, to the literal truth condition is clearly determined in the context. They
usually adopt a Kaplanian approach (Almog et al., 1989) to restrict the relevant context to a
limited set of contextual parameters, such as the speaker, the place, and so on. These param-
eters are objects instead of subjective intentions of the communicators. The contribution of
this narrow context can be understood as the value of a function (character) that takes this
narrow context as input. On the other hand, semantic minimalists do not deny that full-blown
homonyms such as “bank” are ambiguous so that contexts are needed to disambiguate which
of them it refers. However, minimalists deny that any more context-sensitivity than the basic
set and disambiguation exists when recovering a truth-conditional minimal proposition from
an utterance.
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On the other hand, semantic contextualists (Recanati, 2004, 2010; Carston, 2008) argue
that it is rarely the case that a literal truth condition can be recovered from a declarative utter-
ance when supplied with contexts even if indexicals and ambiguity are already properly dealt
with in context (moderate contextualism). Some even argue that it is never the case that a
truth-conditional literal meaning can be recovered from an utterance without knowing the full
context, which is everything and anything that is relevant to what a speaker is on about in con-
trast to Kaplanian narrow context (radical contextualism). Instead, contextualists argue that
even the most normal and literal uses of words are context-sensitive in terms of their semantic
contribution to the literal truth condition. For example, there are context shifting cases in which
a single declarative sentence without indexicals and ambiguities has different truth conditions
in different contexts of utterance.
(2) There is no beer in the fridge
Consider a scenario in which (2) is uttered at a party when someone wants to drink some-
thing cold, an utterance of (2) means that there is no canned or bottled beer in the fridge. If (2)
is uttered when someone is cleaning the inside surface of a fridge, an utterance of (2) probably
means that there are no beer stains on the inside surface of the fridge. In these two scenar-
ios, “beer” refers to different things, bottled beer, or beer stains, which are determined in the
context. However, there is no overt grammatical trigger for this context-sensitivity. “Beer” is
just a regular open-class noun. And in both scenarios, “beer” is used literally rather than fig-
uratively or metaphorically. Contextualists argue that the truth conditional difference in these
two scenarios is the result of semantic modulation, which does not require an overt bottom-up
grammatical trigger as proposed by semantic minimalists. Similar cases of semantic modula-
tion are pervasive in linguistic communication. As a result, contextualists argue that context-
sensitivity of the literal truth condition is way more pervasive than the basic set of indexical
and ambiguity. Hence, semantic minimalism is false.
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4.3 The Problem of Polysemy for Semantic Minimalism
Polysemous words, as we discussed in the previous chapters, are words with multiple related
meanings such as “power” and “book.” “Power” can mean either the political power as in
“China’s increasing power in the global stage” or the electric power as in “the power of the
house is off.” These related senses need to be specified in the context of the utterance. It is
obvious that both “power”s can be used in a literal way that alters the truth condition captured
in semantics. As a result, polysemy seems to be an obvious case of context-sensitive semantic
contribution to the literal truth condition of an utterance.
There are three strategies for semantic minimalism to deal with polysemy. First, they could
argue that the context-sensitivity of polysemous words does not need to be handled at all in
terms of recovering the minimal proposition from an utterance. The semantic contribution
of polysemous words to the minimal proposition is insensitive to context, while the context-
sensitive part belongs to the realm of the conversational implicature or speech act content.
Second, minimalists could treat polysemy in the same way as ambiguous expressions, such as
homonyms, as they acknowledge that ambiguous expressions need to be disambiguated into
the correct interpretation based on the context. Third, minimalists could argue that polysemy
is handled in the same way as the expressions in the basic set of context-sensitivity so that
polysemous words are treated like indexicals such as “I,” and “here.”
In the following three sections, I discuss these three strategies in detail and argue that
none of them work for minimalism. Therefore, polysemy remains a problem for semantic
minimalism.
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4.4 Strategy 1: No Need to Handle Polysemy for Minimal
Proposition
In this section, I discuss the first option that the context-sensitivity of polysemy does not need
to be handled for the sake of recovering the minimal proposition. My objection is that even
though it may be plausible to claim that there is a minimal meaning of a polysemous word
irrespective of contexts, the minimal proposition containing it will cease to be truth-evaluable.
Therefore, minimalists cannot hold their thesis (1), if they accept this option.
Consider the polysemous word “window,”
(3) Tom jumps through the window.
(4) Tom breaks the window.
“Window” can either refer to the window pane as in (4) or the window aperture as in (3), so it
is a context-sensitive polysemous word. However, a minimalist can respond that both tokens of
“window” make the same semantic contribution to each minimal proposition. “Window” just
means window in both (3) and (4). The difference in the interpretation between a window pane
and a window aperture lies in non-minimal speech act content of the utterance of them. Mini-
malists will say that polysemy is just not something that occurs within the minimal proposition
of an utterance.
A similar case that semantic minimalists have replied directly to is the context-sensitivity
of “tall,”
(5) Mount Everest is tall.
(6) Kobe Bryant is tall.
Kobe Bryant is tall as a human but not tall as a mountain. Contextualists hold that contexts
influence the truth conditional contribution of “tall” in (5) and (6). However, minimalists such
as Cappelen and Lepore (2004) deny the existence of these kinds of context-sensitivity within
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literal truth conditions. They argue that the literal truth condition of (5) is just that Mount
Everest is tall and same for (6).
They back their position with context-sensitivity tests such as the conjunction test. In a
conjunction test, two different true sentences containing the alleged context-sensitive expres-
sion are put into conjunction. If the conjunction is also true and non-bizarre, it shows that this
expression is not context-sensitive.
(7) Mount Everest and Kobe Bryant are tall.
That the conjunction (7) built from the true (5) and the true (6) is also true shows that “tall”
passes the conjunction test. Therefore, as argued by semantic minimalists, “tall” is not context-
sensitive.
This reply could be adapted to argue that “window” is not context-sensitive within the
literal truth condition in (3) and (4). And luckily, “window” belongs to a special category of
polysemy that passes the conjunction test. If we build a conjunction from (3) and (4), we get
(8) What Tom jumped through and Jack broke yesterday is this window.
In (8), “window” is predicated with two different properties, being jumped through and
being broken. According to the traditional interpretation, these two properties belong to two
different senses of “window,” window aperture and window pane. However, (8) does not lead to
hampered interpretation and is still true, which could serve as support for minimalists’ strategy
that polysemy is not context-sensitive within the minimal proposition.
However, I want to argue that this strategy does not generalize to all polysemy. The “win-
dow” example works because “window” belongs to a special category within regular polysemy.
For this kind of polysemous word, different senses of it refer to different aspects of a single
unified object. Panes and apertures are two aspects with which to conceptualize windows.
They are two spatial-temporal components of this metaphysically complex object — window
— so that both senses can be derived from this object. However, not all polysemous words are
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like this in terms of how different senses are related to each other. The semantic relatedness
between senses of different polysemous words is wildly various. For example, the word “line”
in
(9) The data can be fitted with a curved line.
(10) The prince is removed from the royal line.
(11) It is unprofessional for an actor to forget his line.
(12) Every company here wants to expand its business line.
All these tokens of “line” are related in certain ways but not spatial-temporally connected
as the pane and aperture of a window. Instead, these senses refer to very different entities of
very different domains. If semantic minimalists want to continue their strategy of “window,”
they have to argue that “line” contributes semantically the same to the literal truth conditions of
all four utterances, which seems absurd. The problem for the semantic minimalists is to decide
what is the minimal truth conditional contribution of “line” to each minimal proposition — the
minimal meaning of “line.”
Minimalists could opt for an underspecified meaning of “line” which somehow generalizes
to all different senses of “line,” but this move makes the minimal proposition of sentences
containing “line” cease to be truth-conditional, because this underspecified meaning of “line”
does not pick out any particular object in the world if this underspecification has to include all
four different senses. On the other hand, minimalists can opt for one sense of “line” among
all of them. However, this creates another problem. That is, it eliminates certain analyticity or
semantic entailment.
Consider the word “square,” which is polysemous. “Square” either means a geometric
object with four right angles and four equal sides or a big open area surrounded by buildings.
(13) All squares have four sides.
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(14) A line is a one-dimensional object.
(13) is analytically true in a context where “square” refers to a geometric object, but not
analytically true if “square” refers to open space. Similarly, (14) is analytically true if “line”
refers to the mathematical object, but analytically false if it means other senses such as drama
line. As a result, if minimalists choose any particular sense as the minimal meaning of a
polysemous word, it may eliminate the possibility for a sentence to be analytic based on which
sense is deemed as essential.
In sum, if semantic minimalists hold that polysemy is not context-sensitive in terms of its
contribution to the minimal proposition, this strategy only works for some words like “win-
dow.” For most words, minimalists have to either posit some underspecified meanings as the
minimal meanings or choose one sense among all the polysemous senses as the minimal mean-
ings. However, none of these options work out. Therefore, I argue that this strategy of denying
the context-sensitivity of polysemy in contributing to literal truth condition is not plausible.
4.5 Strategy 2: Handle Polysemy as Ambiguity
The second strategy for semantic minimalists to handle polysemy is to simply treat polysemy
as ambiguity. Everyone agrees that contexts are needed for disambiguation. For example,
homonyms, which are different words with the same spelling or pronunciation, need to be
disambiguated according to the context. Whether “bat” is disambiguated into the animal bat or
the baseball bat depends on the context, both the linguistic context and broader context of the
utterance. Therefore, minimalists could argue that polysemy is just another case of ambiguity
so that sentences containing so-called polysemy are first disambiguated into the correct senses
before a definite truth-evaluative proposition is assigned. For example, Cappelen and Lepore
(2008) suppose that one needs to “disambiguate every ambiguous/polysemous expression in
S. (Cappelen and Lepore, 2008, p.145)” in order to recover the minimal proposition from an
utterance.
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My general objection to this strategy is that polysemous senses are not discrete entities that
can be disambiguated into. First, I argue that flexible uses of polysemy make it difficult to
individuate and encode discrete polysemous senses. Second, encoding polysemous senses as
discrete forms is incompatible with the fact that polysemy is productive. Third, I present some
psycholinguistic evidence to show that disambiguation does not seem to exist for polysemy,
which is different from homonyms.
4.5.1 Flexibility of Polysemy
First, our uses of polysemous words are very flexible. It is extremely difficult to individuate
different uses of polysemous words into discrete bins of senses, because different polysemous
senses are closely related. It is often arbitrary to set a threshold on the continuous scale of se-
mantic relatedness, which is very different from categorizing different meanings of homonyms
because their meanings are more clearly separated.
The individuation of polysemous senses is aggravated by the fact that we don’t perceive
word meaning in different contexts categorically. This is in sharp contrast with the categorical
perception of speech sound. It is well known in psycholinguistics since the work of Liberman
et al. (1957) that humans perceive phonemes categorically even though the acoustic features
of different phonemes are continuous. For example, when we continuously increase the voice
onset time of the vowel, our perceptual identification of the phoneme will change abruptly
from /da/ to /ta/, hence categorical perception. However, we are not aware of this kind of
abrupt change in the domain of word meaning but homonymy is like this. The continuity of
polysemous senses makes the individuation of polysemous sense more arbitrary.
On the other hand, the difficulty and arbitrariness of sense individuation have been testified
by centuries of lexicographical work. As a matter of fact, different dictionaries and lexical
databases often give different sense individuations.
For example, for “paper:”
• WordNet
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(15) S: (n) composition, paper, report, theme (an essay (especially one written as
an assignment)) “he got an A on his composition.”
(16) S: (n) paper (a scholarly article describing the results of observations or stating
hypotheses) “he has written many scientific papers.”
• The Oxford Dictionary of English
(17) an essay or dissertation, especially one read at an academic lecture or seminar
or published in an academic journal: he published a highly original paper on pattern
formation.
WordNet separates essays submitted in the class and essays submitted to journals and as-
signs them into different bins of senses, while The Oxford Dictionary of English only has one
sense bin for class paper and journal paper, so it assigns them into the same one.
There is a deeper problem of linguistic categorization underlying sense individuation. Am-
bridge (2019) call it the lumping-or-splitting problem as discussed in Chapter 1. When indi-
viduating senses, theorists have to either lump different uses of a word into one sense or split
them into different senses. Lumping is difficult because it may ignore the difference of meaning
within the lumped sense category. Splitting is also difficult because there is no principled way
to stop further splitting. This lumping or splitting problem marks the flexibility of polysemy
that different senses of polysemous words are not clear cut and set in stone. People use different
senses of polysemous words in widely different and nuanced ways.
The arbitrariness of sense individuation makes the strategy of disambiguating polysemy
very impractical because it is hard to come up with a list of polysemous senses which can be
disambiguated into the minimal proposition.
4.5.2 Productivity of Polysemy
Even if we can arrive at a workable manner of polysemous sense individuation, encoding pol-
ysemy as discrete senses does not fit with the productivity of polysemy.
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One distinctive feature of human language is its productivity. We can produce and under-
stand an unlimited number of linguistic expressions. Thus, there will always be new expres-
sions that were not produced or understood in the past but could be produced and understood
in the future. Productivity occurs at different levels of language. For example, we can combine
morphemes to create new words, we can combine words to create new phrases, and we can
combine phrases to form new sentences. The same feature of productivity applies to polysemy
as well. In the following, I present examples of productivity that is at odds with the strategy of
treating polysemy as ambiguity, because new senses are not encoded in the lexicon.
For example, names are polysemous among the person being named, their work, and so on.
(18) Shakespeare is well educated.
(19) People don’t read Shakespeare here.
(20) Every library has some Shakespeare.
“Shakespeare” in (18) refers to the person Shakespeare, while “Shakespeare” and “Shake-
speare” in (19) and (20) refer to the work or copies of work of Shakespeare. However, “Shake-
speare” can also be used in productive ways as in (21) which refers to a digital file that can be
encrypted.
(21) The Shakespeare in my Kindle is locked.
Not only can new senses come into existence, regular patterns of polysemous senses can
be transferred to new words. Regular patterns can be seen among a category called regular
polysemy. For example, there is ARTICLE-INFORMATION polysemy, such as “book” and
“dictionary.” Both of them have the ARTICLE sense and the INFORMATION sense as in
(22)/(23) and (24)/(25). And these two senses have similar cases of use.
(22) This book is very heavy.
(23) This book is very difficult.
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(24) I threw the dictionary to him.
(25) I revised the dictionary by myself.
However, these patterns are not only summarizations of old uses, but also generalizable to
new words. For example, e-books as electronic books are digital files that emerged in the late
20th century. The use of the word “e-book” catches up with the ARTICLE-INFORMATION
pattern very quickly. Even though an e-book cannot be literally thrown or torn, it has distinctive
features that only belongs to it as an article.
Therefore,
(26) I deleted the e-book on my system.
(27) This is the best selling e-book this year.
There are other categories of regular polysemy, such as MEAT-ANIMAL polysemy that
can be applied to new animals or animals that are never eaten before.
(28) Armadillo is an interesting animal.
(29) You shouldn’t eat armadillo.
Even if the word “armadillo” has never been used to express the MEAT sense before, there
would be no obstacle to understand that (29) means eating the meat of armadillo rather than
the whole animal.
In sum, both individual senses and regular patterns of senses are productive. However,
this productivity is at odds with the strategy of treating polysemy as ambiguity because new
senses cannot be encoded in the lexicon beforehand. Therefore, new senses cannot be activated
through disambiguation because disambiguation assumes a list-like representation of senses,
which does not capture well the productivity of polysemy.
As a result, productivity makes it implausible for polysemous senses to be encoded as a
list of discrete entities. Instead of encoding discrete senses of each animal’s meat, maybe a
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better approach is to posit lexical rules as in Pelletier (1975)’s and Copestake and Briscoe
(1995)’s work or some kinds of generative mechanism such as co-composition as in Puste-
jovsky (1998)’s theory of Generative Lexicon, which leads to the third strategy in the next
section.
4.5.3 Psycholinguistic Evidence against Polysemy Disambiguation
In this section, I am going to provide some psycholinguistic evidence that polysemy processing
does not involve disambiguation. Disambiguation is the process of decision-making — choos-
ing one among several interpretations. In general, disambiguation requires more cognitive
processing, so polysemous words are slower to process compared to monosemous words.
There are several lexical decision tasks investigating polysemy processing. In lexical de-
cision tasks, subjects are shown real words and fake words on a computer screen. The task is
to press a button to decide whether the word is a real word or not, hence, a lexical decision.
A lot of variables will influence the reaction time of lexical decisions such as the frequency
of the word, length of the word, or priming conditions. Azuma and Van Orden (1997), Rodd
et al. (2002), and Klepousniotou and Baum (2007) studied the relationship between reaction
time and the relatedness of word senses. They found that words with related meanings (poly-
semy) have quicker reaction times than monosemous words, while words with unrelated mean-
ings have a slower reaction time than monosemous words. (homonymy). Hence, polysemous
words are processed faster than monosemous words, while homonyms with unrelated mean-
ings are processed slower than monosemous words. This indicates that polysemous words are
processed differently from homonyms in real-time processing.
Furthermore, the sensicality judgment experiment conducted in the previous chapters shows
that human semantic processing is sensitive to the minute difference between tokens of poly-
semous words belonging to the same bin of sense. This indicates that human utilizes more
nuanced continuous meaning than discrete bins of senses.
In sum, I argue that polysemy cannot be simply treated as ambiguity because (1) polysemy
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is difficult to be classified into discrete senses; (2) disambiguating from a list of discrete senses
is not compatible with the productivity of polysemy; (3) psycholinguistic evidence shows that
polysemy is not processed like ambiguity. Therefore, semantic minimalists cannot resort to
this strategy to handle polysemy.
4.6 Strategy 3: Assimilate Polysemy into the Basic Set of
Context-Sensitivity
The last strategy for semantic minimalists is to assimilate polysemy into the basic set of
context-sensitive expressions so that polysemy can be handled in a similar way as indexi-
cals. As a result, different polysemous senses can be taken to be the outputs of some context-
sensitive semantic operations, such as the character in Kaplan’s theory of indexical (Almog
et al., 1989), Stern (2000)’s Mthat operation or Pelletier (1975)’s lexical rule of grinding. The
output of the context-sensitive operation is then integrated into the minimal proposition to cap-
ture its context-sensitivity.
On the one hand, lexical rules such as grinding (Pelletier, 1975; Copestake and Briscoe,
1995) are introduced to capture some specific rule-like patterns in polysemy such as ANIMAL-
MEAT, CONTENT-ARTICLE polysemy. These rules convert a polysemous word from one of
its senses to another before being contributed to the literal truth condition. For example, the
meaning of “chicken” can be converted by the grinding rule from the animal sense to the meat
sense in sentences such as “bodybuilders eat chicken every day.” The problem with these kinds
of approaches is similar to what I have discussed in the previous sections. Polysemous words
with these kinds of regular patterns are only a small fraction of all polysemous words. Other
polysemous words such as “line” or “case,” have unique sense patterns that do not conform to
rule-like patterns. As a result, the approach of lexical rules is not extensible to all polysemous
words.
On the other hand, more general approaches for semantic minimalists can be based on
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Kaplan’s theory of indexicals. Kaplan develops his original approach to capture the apparent
context-sensitivity of demonstratives and indexicals in semantics, such as “I,” “here, ” and “he.”
His approach includes distinguishing the character and the content of a word. The character of
a word is a function from its context of evaluation to its content in the context. For example, the
character of “I” is a function that takes the context of the utterance as an input and outputs the
speaker of the utterance as its content. As a result, the content of “I” is context-sensitive, but
the character of “I” itself is context-insensitive. Stern (2000, 2011) adapted Kaplan’s approach
by inventing the Mthat[t] operator. Mthat[t] “expresses a set of properties P presupposed to
be m-associated with t in a context c,” which are properties expressed by metaphors. “The
metaphorical expression ‘Mthat[t]’ has a non-constant character, i.e., a meaning or rule (or
function) that in different contexts yields different contents, i.e., different truth-conditional fac-
tors (for predicates, properties).” Similar adaptation can be made to design an operator —
Pthat[t], that takes the context of a polysemous as an input and outputs the correct sense of the
polysemous word. Hence, it also has a non-constant character to capture the context-sensitivity
of polysemy. However, this approach faces the problem of being not explanatory enough. Even
though it is certain that there exists such a function from the context of a polysemous word to its
correct interpretation, giving out the function itself does not explain what the context-sensitive
process of polysemy actually is. Particularly, providing the extension of the character func-
tion, the mapping between context and content, lacks the explanation of the mechanisms of the
context-sensitive operation. Instead, providing the intension of the character as rules face the
problems of comprehensibility as discussed in the last paragraph. As a result, a more flexible
and comprehensive way to define the intention of this character function is needed.
Last but most importantly, it is doubtful that the approaches of assimilating polysemy into
the basic set square with the thesis of semantic minimalism. Polysemous words are ubiquitous
in any natural language. Based on Rodd et al. (2002)’s analysis of CELEX lexical database
(Baayen et al., 1993), 84% of the words in English have more than one senses. Assimilating
84% of words into the basic set will make the basic set cease to be basic. Furthermore, most
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polysemous words do not form a distinctive grammatical category as indexicals, so it goes
against the tenet of semantic minimalism that every context-sensitivity in literal truth condi-
tions is triggered by grammar. In sum, I argue in this section that minimalist approaches that
assimilate polysemy into the basic set are not satisfactory, and they even contradict the thesis
of semantic minimalism by allowing a wide range of context-sensitivity within the minimal
proposition.
4.7 What is Needed to Account for Polysemy?
In this section, I want to discuss the reason why semantic minimalism does not handle poly-
semy well. It is because of its denial of semantic modulation in the literal truth condition of an
utterance.
Polysemy, on the one hand, is largely literal, conventional, and regular in use. This makes
polysemy different from non-literal uses of words such as metaphors, so it is hard to deny the
semantic contribution of polysemy to the literal truth condition of an utterance. On the other
hand, polysemy is very flexible and productive. They are used in very nuanced ways, which
makes them difficult to be classified into discrete sense bins for future disambiguation, and it
can be used in productive ways that have not been used before. I argue in the previous sections
that these features of polysemy make it ill-suited to be handled within a minimalist approach,
because polysemy requires theories to handle its flexible and context-sensitive contribution to
the literal truth conditions of utterances.
As a result, a context-sensitive process within semantics is necessary to capture the phe-
nomena of polysemy, which is semantic modulation. Modulation is the process where the
meaning of a word is affected by the meanings of other words or situations in the context.22
It belongs to the primary pragmatic process (Recanati, 2004), whose content is first available
to our consciousness during comprehension. It is in contrast with the secondary pragmatic
22The terminology “modulation” is used in roughly the same way as Cruse (1986), Ruhl (1989), and Recanati
(2004).
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process, which involves inferential processes starting from the content derived in the primary
pragmatic process. In the previous chapters, I argue that semantic modulation is various in
terms of underlying mechanisms and continuous in terms of how far meaning is changed in
context. These two features make semantic modulation fine-grained enough to capture the
nuanced flexibility of polysemy within the literal truth condition of an utterance.
Furthermore, in order to capture the regularity and productivity of polysemy, I argue that
polysemy is not just semantic modulation. Instead, It is the clustering and entrenchment of
frequent semantic modulations from repetitive uses. When similar modulations repetitively
occur, they form a cluster, which corresponds to our intuitive concept of polysemous senses.
Furthermore, these patterns of clustering are entrenched in our memory so that they can be
more readily used in the future. The productivity of polysemy comes from analogy with these
entrenched clusters. The frequency and variability of these entrenched senses clusters deter-
mine how productive each word will be and where is the constraint on certain productive uses.
In sum, words that are modulated in a certain way — forming multiple clusters, are polyse-
mous. These meaning clusters are entrenched in memory to facilitate future productive uses
through analogy.
However, admitting the existence of semantic modulation contradicts with (1),
(1) a truth-evaluative minimal proposition can be recovered from an utterance if the val-
ues of grammatically triggered context-sensitive expressions are assigned and ambiguous
words are disambiguated.
In principle, any word can be modulated by context, and most modulations are not bottom-
up driven by grammar, neither syntax nor morphology. Instead, it is a free pragmatic process
that occurs during linguistic production and comprehension. Therefore, (1) is false if admitting
the existence of semantic modulation.
Recanati (2017b, 2019) provides a similar argument for the conclusion that polysemy sup-
ports semantic contextualism. Recanati more specifically points out that the mandatoriness of
polysemy modulation supports radical contextualism because every polysemous word needs to
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be modulated by the context in order to recover the literal truth condition of an utterance. In
contrast, modulation of word meaning by context is optional in moderate contextualism. The
type meaning of a word can either directly serve as the literal meaning of the utterance or being
modulated. However, because the type meaning of a polysemous word is a combination of its
different senses (Recanati adopts Langacker (2008)’s network representation of polysemy type
meaning.), the modulation of a polysemous word is mandatory. Therefore, Recanati argues
that the existence and pervasiveness of polysemy support the view of radical contextualism.
In sum, polysemy cannot be well handled by the semantic minimalist. Instead, one has to
adopt semantic modulation, which is contradictory to the semantic minimalist thesis (1). As a
result, polysemy goes against semantic minimalism and supports semantic contextualism.
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